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HOW COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS
CAMOUFLAGE THE COSTS OF
SHAREHOLDER LAWSUITS
RICHARD SQUIRE†
ABSTRACT
Corporations insure against liability in shareholder lawsuits by
buying tiered coverage from multiple insurers who each cover a
distinct segment of the potential damages range. Rather than
negotiating to settle individually with the plaintiff, the insurers seek to
reach a single, collectively binding settlement agreement. This
combination of segmented coverage and collective settlements
produces a conflict of interests: the corporation’s managers and some
insurers are better off if the case settles pre-trial for the expected
damages, while other insurers are better off going to trial. To force
reluctant insurers to settle, courts have created a duty that can require
an insurer to pay its policy amount when the plaintiff makes a
settlement demand that exceeds that amount and another insurer or
the corporation is willing to pay the rest. This “duty to contribute”
biases negotiations toward settlements that overcompensate plaintiffs,
thereby encouraging lawsuits of doubtful merit. The conflict of
interests in settlement negotiations could be eliminated by allowing
defense-side parties (defendants and their liability insurers) to settle
separately their respective segments of the damages range. But this
“segmented” approach to settlements is contrary to the private
interests of managers because it eliminates the justification for the
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duty to contribute. That duty forces insurers to pay for settlements that
they think are excessive or contractually uninsurable, thereby
shielding corporate earnings reports—and managers’ incentive-based
pay—from the costs of shareholder lawsuits resulting from the
managers’ conduct.
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INTRODUCTION
Liability insurance makes defendants overeager to settle risky
lawsuits. If a lawsuit goes to trial, the damages award could be greater
than the coverage limit on the defendant’s liability policy, forcing the
defendant to pay the excess. But the plaintiff will usually be willing to
settle before trial for a discounted amount that factors in the
possibility of a verdict for the defendant. Settling pre-trial thus
compresses the liability burden, increasing the proportion that falls
within the insurance policy limit and hence is borne by the insurer.
This opportunity to concentrate liability on the insurer can make the
defendant better off settling before trial even when the plaintiff’s
settlement demand exceeds the expected (that is, risk-discounted)
damages. And the insurer has the opposite bias: it often is better off
going to trial, even when the plaintiff is willing to settle for less than
the expected damages.
The same dynamic arises in the more complex situation in which
the defendant has multiple liability insurers, as is typical in
shareholder lawsuits against corporate managers for securities fraud
and breaches of fiduciary duties. To cover the costs of such suits, most
public corporations purchase not just one directors-and-officers
(D&O) liability insurance policy, but rather a stack of them, forming
a so-called insurance “tower.” The tower’s ground floor is occupied
by a “primary” insurer that bears the initial liability in a lawsuit up to
its policy limit. Upper floors are occupied by a series of “excess”
insurers, each of whose liability begins at the limit of the policy
immediately below it in the tower. As liability mounts, the policies
are exhausted in succession. When a lawsuit’s trial outcome is
uncertain, the primary insurer is biased toward trial, the insured
defendants are biased toward settling before trial, and the excess
insurers divide in their biases based on where the expected damages
fall within the tower.
To encourage settlements by insurers that are structurally biased
toward trial, courts have read two duties into liability insurance
contracts. The first duty requires an insurer to settle before trial when
it can do so for a reasonable amount within its policy limit. This “duty
to settle” has been thoroughly analyzed by academic commentators.
The second duty requires an insurer to contribute its policy amount to
a settlement when the plaintiff’s settlement demand is above the
insurer’s policy limit but another defense-side party—that is, another
insurer or the defendant—is willing to pay the above-limit portion.
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This second duty has been ignored by commentators, and indeed
there is no conventional name for it: this Article calls it the “duty to
contribute.”
This duty distorts negotiations by permitting
“cramdown” settlements in which a party on an upper floor of an
insurance tower settles with the plaintiff and then shifts most of the
liability to the insurers below. Because cramdown settlements
concentrate liability on non-consenting third parties, they will tend to
overcompensate plaintiffs, the predictable consequence of a judgemade duty that favors the parties in settlement negotiations who are
overeager to settle.
A more efficient way to resolve the conflict of interests in
settlement negotiations would be to eliminate the conflict at its
source. Courts and commentators have treated the conflict as an
inevitable byproduct of insurance policy limits. But the conflict is not
inevitable; rather, it arises only when a settlement takes the form of a
collective resolution that binds all defense-side parties. The
presumption that settlements must be collective is so widespread that
it has gone essentially unnoticed. Yet the presumption is worth
questioning, as it is the reason that settlement causes some defenseside parties to pay more, and others to pay less, than their expected
liability at trial. This divergence between trial burdens and settlement
burdens encourages strategic behavior, as it enables defense-side
parties to shift liability onto each other when deciding whether to
accept or reject a settlement offer.
This conflict of interests in settlement negotiations would be
eliminated if each defense-side party were allowed to settle separately
its respective slice of the damages range. Under this “segmented”
approach to settlements, trial would occur unless all slices settled, and
the plaintiff would collect at trial only those awarded damages (if
any) that fell within the unsettled slices. Segmenting settlements in
this way would eliminate the mismatch between trial liability and
settlement liability that encourages strategic behavior. Unlike the
judge-made duties to settle and contribute, this segmented approach
would address both sides of the conflict: lower-level insurers would
no longer be biased against settling, and upper-level insurers and
defendants would no longer be biased in favor of settling. With these
biases eliminated, the duties to settle and contribute could be
abandoned as obsolete. And because the duty to contribute produces
cramdown settlements, its elimination would remove the plaintiffovercompensation hazard.

SQUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS

9/17/2012 12:50 PM

5

If segmented settlements really would be more efficient, why
have they not been adopted already? Outside the context of
shareholder litigation, the most likely obstacle to the segmented
approach is liability insurers’ traditional “duty to defend.” For
example, automobile and homeowners liability policies state that the
insurer, in addition to covering the policyholder’s liability in a lawsuit,
will defend the policyholder through trial. Courts might deem an
insurer to have breached its duty to defend if it settled out of a lawsuit
without obtaining a complete release for the policyholder as well.
D&O policies, by contrast, cover corporate managers who
typically disclaim the insurer’s duty to defend and insist on controlling
their own defenses. Therefore, in shareholder lawsuits the most likely
explanation for the persistence of collective settlements is not the
duty to defend, but rather the managers’ private interests. Managers
benefit from the collective approach because it provides a
justification for the duty to contribute, which can be used to
overcome insurer resistance to settlement. Yet structural bias caused
by the collective settlements approach is not the only reason that
insurers might resist settling. They also might resist because they
think that the plaintiff is demanding more than the lawsuit is worth,
or that coverage is likely to be excused at trial by a finding that the
defendants deliberately engaged in misconduct. There is no publicpolicy reason to force insurers to settle when their resistance is based
on these alternative grounds. But the duty to contribute does not
discriminate, as it forces insurers to settle regardless of their reasons
for rejecting a plaintiff’s settlement demand.
Under the segmented approach to settlements, there would be
no mechanism to force settlements by insurers that believe that the
plaintiff is overreaching or that a coverage exclusion is likely. For this
reason, the segmented approach would cause the proportion of
settlements paid by D&O insurers to fall. The additional liability
would be borne not by the managers who defend such suits, but
rather by their corporations, which invariably agree to indemnify
managers for liability that they incur on the job. But managers would
still be averse to the change, because insurance coverage prevents a
large settlement payment from causing a drop in the corporation’s
reported earnings that could draw unfavorable investor attention and
reduce managers’ performance-based pay. In this way, insurance
shields managers who are sued by reducing the volatility of their
corporation’s reported earnings.
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Although insurance coverage for settlements benefits corporate
managers, it imposes a host of costs on shareholders. First, by
camouflaging the costs of shareholder lawsuits, insurance reduces the
usefulness of a firm’s reported earnings as a measure of the
contribution of that firm’s managers to diversified shareholder
wealth. Second, by encouraging plaintiff overcompensation, the duty
to contribute gives plaintiffs’ attorneys an incentive to file lawsuits of
doubtful merit. Third, both the duty to contribute and the duty to
settle require potentially expensive follow-up lawsuits over whether
the duties have been breached. Fourth, cramdown settlements
discourage insurer specialization by concentrating liability for both
low-risk and high-risk lawsuits on primary insurers. And fifth,
collective settlements lead to overspending on defense attorneys, as
D&O policies combine coverage for litigation expenses with coverage
for liability to discourage insurers from rejecting reasonable
settlement offers. Each of the last four costs drives up D&O
insurance premiums, which shareholders ultimately pay.
Courts seem unaware that reading a duty to contribute into
D&O policies advances managers’ interests at the expense of
shareholders. Judicial opinions cite the bias of primary insurers
against settling but do not mention the countervailing bias that makes
defendants and some excess insurers overeager to settle. Courts could
increase social wealth by being much leerier of the duty to contribute
in shareholder lawsuits. Given that defendants in such cases are
sophisticated enough to insist on running their own defenses and
negotiating directly with plaintiffs to settle, the justification for the
duty to contribute does not apply. And without this mechanism for
camouflaging the costs of shareholder lawsuits, managers would be
less reluctant to adopt an alternative settlements approach that would
increase shareholder profits.
The rest of this Article has four parts. Part I explains the conflict
of interests that occurs in settlement negotiations when settlements
are collective, and it describes the various legal devices—including
the duty to contribute—that have been developed to overcome it.
Part II describes the social costs of these various conflict-control
devices. Part III explains how the defense-side conflict of interests
that courts and commentators attribute to policy limits would
disappear if settlements were segmented rather than collective. Part
IV describes why, despite the efficiencies of the segmented approach,
corporate managers probably prefer the status quo. A brief
conclusion and an appendix follow.
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I. STRUCTURAL CONFLICT WHEN SETTLEMENTS ARE COLLECTIVE
The conflict of interests among liability insurers and defendants
in settlement negotiations is caused by the interaction of two factors:
policy limits, which serve valuable economic functions, and the
collective approach to settlements, which often does not. Several legal
devices have been developed to manage this conflict, but these
presuppose—and indeed tend to reinforce—the collective approach,
thereby failing to correct the problem at its source.
The conflict of interests is perhaps most conspicuous in the
context of D&O insurance, which protects public corporations and
their mangers against the most significant source of civil liability they
face: shareholder litigation. For this reason, this Part begins by
describing the structure of D&O coverage purchased by public firms.
Many of the qualitative observations about D&O insurance are,
however, also true of other important types of commercial liability
coverage.
A. Liability and Insurance in Shareholder Litigation
As Professors Thomas Baker and Sean Griffith describe in an
important recent book on shareholder litigation, the most important
source of civil liability for American public corporations is the
1
shareholder class action alleging fraud on the securities markets.
2
These lawsuits, the majority of which are brought under Rule 10b-5
3
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, can be highly lucrative for
4
plaintiffs and their attorneys. Between 2003 and 2008, the average
5
settlement payout in 10b-5 class actions was $45 million. And a
handful of cases are worth much more: a case against McKesson
6
HBOC settled in 2008 for $1.1 billion. By comparison, the average
profits of a Fortune 500 company between 2003 and 2008 were $256

1. TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 21 (2010).
2. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
4. Sixty-six percent of securities class actions brought in 2010 alleged violations of Rule
10b-5. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW
31 (2011), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-2010-year-in-review.
5. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 22.
6. Id. at 23.
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million per quarter. Thus, the average settlement in this period
would have reduced the average Fortune 500 corporation’s earnings
by 18 percent in the quarter in which it was reported—that is, if the
8
settlement were not covered by insurance.
Because of the role that managers play in preparing and
reviewing corporate financial reports, virtually all 10b-5 actions name
9
at least one corporate manager as a defendant. As a practical matter,
however, the managers rarely bear personal liability in securities class
10
actions. One important reason for the managers’ de facto immunity
is that almost all public corporations agree to indemnify their
11
managers for liability that they incur on the job. To be sure, general
incorporation statutes forbid indemnification when the corporate
12
agent is shown to have acted in bad faith or with wrongful intent.
But these indemnification disqualifiers are almost never established,
as essentially all 10b-5 claims are either dismissed or settled before
13
trial, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys have no financial incentive to insist
that the defendants admit wrongdoing in the settlement agreement.
Indeed, the incentives go the other way: the corporation usually has
much deeper pockets than its managers, giving the managers and the
7. Earnings figures for the five hundred largest U.S. corporations by revenues (the
“Fortune 500”) are published by Fortune and are available at Fortune 500, CNNMONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
8. This figure actually understates the percentage because the settlement amount is for all
securities actions while the earnings figure is only for Fortune 500 companies, which due to their
size will tend to have higher average liability.
9. See Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, How Protective Is D&O Insurance in Securities
Class Actions?—Part I, PROF. LIABILITY UNDERWRITING SOC’Y J. REPRINT, Feb. 2010, at 1, 2
(finding that 99 percent of securities class-action complaints name the company’s CEO, and 80
percent name the CFO).
10. See id. at 3 (reporting that corporate officers pay into less than 5 percent of securities
class action settlements and that outside directors pay into less than 1 percent).
11. See id. (“[T]he combination of D&O insurance, indemnification, and the ability of the
corporation to pay whatever portion of the settlement the insurer does not pay, provides
substantial protection for officers and directors.”); see also David B. Schulz, Indemnification of
Directors and Officers Against Liabilities Imposed Under Federal Securities Laws, 78 MARQ. L.
REV. 1043, 1045 (1995) (“[I]ndemnification [of directors and officers] is generally provided for
in a corporation’s bylaws or through separate indemnity agreements between the corporation
and its managers.”).
12. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2012); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1)
(1984 & Supp. 1988/89); see also Stockman v. Heartland Indus. Partners, L.P., No. 4227-VCS,
2009 WL 2096213, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009) (discussing the function of the indemnification
exclusions under the Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, ch. 1 (2012));
VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A. 15688, 1999 WL 413393, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1999)
(same).
13. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 22.
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plaintiffs’ attorneys a common interest in ensuring that
14
indemnification by the corporation remains available.
To cover the costs of securities actions, virtually all public
15
corporations purchase D&O insurance. Besides covering the
managers for their personal liability, the typical D&O policy covers
the corporation itself, both for its indemnification obligations to its
agents and for any vicarious liability it incurs under the doctrine of
16
respondeat superior. And, in addition to providing liability
coverage—that is, coverage for amounts paid to plaintiffs in
settlements or judgments—D&O policies provide defense coverage—
that is, coverage for defense attorneys and for other litigation
17
expenses.
D&O insurance is expensive in nominal terms. In 2008, public
companies with market capitalizations of at least $10 billion paid an
18
average of $2.2 million in D&O insurance premiums. In relative
terms, however, this was a small expense—less than 1 percent of these
19
companies’ average annual profits. And the companies seem to have
gotten a good deal of coverage for their money. A recent study of
securities class-action settlements found that D&O insurers paid for
the full settlement in 53 percent of cases, and they paid a portion—
20
usually a large portion—of the settlement in 35 percent more.
Because directors and officers themselves rarely pay anything in such
cases, the amounts not covered by the insurers were paid almost
entirely by the corporations directly.
Besides covering liability in securities actions, D&O insurance
covers the costs of a second type of shareholder lawsuit: the
21
derivative suit. Like securities class actions, most derivative suits are

14. See Klausner & Hegland, supra note 9, at 3 (“Because securities class actions are
settled with defendants denying all wrongdoing, there is no way to know whether actual
misconduct occurred.”).
15. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 44.
16. In the language of D&O insurance, insurance for the corporation’s indemnification
obligations is “Side B” coverage, and insurance for the corporation’s direct litigation liability is
“Side C” coverage. “Side A” coverage is for the managers’ personal liability. Id. at 46–48.
17. Id. at 45.
18. TOWERS WATSON, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY: 2008 SURVEY OF
INSURANCE PURCHASING TRENDS 29 fig.47 (2010), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/
assets/pdf/2791/2791.pdf.
19. In 2008, the average annual earnings for all Fortune 500 companies, many of which had
market capitalizations of less than $10 billion, was $1.3 billion. Fortune 500, supra note 7.
20. Klausner & Hegland, supra note 9, at 1.
21. Id.
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brought by shareholders against corporate managers. The main
difference is that a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the
corporation, meaning that the corporation rather than its
22
shareholders recovers any judgment or settlement payment. General
incorporation statutes prohibit corporations from indemnifying
managers for personal liability in derivative suits, which makes sense
given that otherwise the money flow would be circular, with the
23
corporation paying for its own recovery. But corporations can—and
almost always do—buy D&O insurance for their managers that
24
covers their personal liability in derivative litigation. In this way,
corporations fund their own derivative-suit recoveries ex ante
(through D&O insurance premiums) even though they are prohibited
from doing so ex post (by reimbursing the defendants for the
25
judgment or settlement).
D&O policies always specify that coverage is unavailable if the
defendants are found to have engaged in deliberate fraud or to have
26
enriched themselves at the expense of the corporation. Like the
statutory indemnification disqualifiers, these coverage exclusions
encourage managers to settle before trial to avoid an adverse finding
by a judge or jury that could leave them responsible for their own
legal bills.
Even though most D&O policies cover defense costs, the
corporate managers rather than the insurers control the defenses of
27
shareholder lawsuits. In this way, D&O policies are different from,
22. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTS
(3d ed. 2009).
23. In derivative litigation, corporations can indemnify their managers for legal expenses
such as attorneys’ fees, but not for judgments or amounts paid in settlement. Compare DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2012) (permitting indemnification in direct suits against corporate
agents for “expenses (including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in
settlement”), and MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a) (1985 & Supp. 1988/99) (permitting
indemnification of directors against “liability incurred in the proceeding[s]”), with DEL. tit. 8, §
145(b) (permitting indemnification in derivative suits only for “expenses (including attorneys’
fees)”), and MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(d)(1) (prohibiting indemnification in derivative
suits except for “reasonable expenses”).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (authorizing D&O insurance); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.57 (1985 & Supp. 2000/01/02) (same); BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 57
(noting that the “vast majority” of public corporations buy both individual coverage for
directors and officers and entity-level coverage for the corporation).
25. In addition, the plaintiffs’ attorneys in a derivative suit can recover their fees directly
from the corporation. E.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149–54 (Ct. App.
1968).
26. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 49.
27. Id. at 130.
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 364
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for example, automobile and homeowners liability policies, which
28
assign the insurer both the right and the duty to run the defense.
One potential reason for this difference is that insurers may be more
likely to assert coverage defenses for intentional misconduct in the
D&O context, creating a conflict of interests if the insurers were also
running the defenses of the lawsuits. Other reasons that corporate
managers would rather run their own defenses in shareholder lawsuits
are that the managers typically have their own preferred lawyers, and
that a public trial could impose reputational costs that, unlike
monetary liability, cannot be shifted to the insurer.
The managers’ right to run their own defenses entails a right to
negotiate directly with plaintiffs to settle. D&O policies provide,
however, that the insurer must consent to a settlement agreement to
29
be bound by it. Such provisions are strictly enforced, with courts
holding that policyholders forfeit coverage if they settle without first
30
seeking the insurer’s permission. This does not mean, however, that
the insurer has an absolute veto right, as the insurer can be held liable
for rejecting a settlement offer that a court later decides was
31
reasonable.
As with other types of liability insurance, D&O policies always
32
come with coverage caps, known as policy amounts or limits. Policy
limits make liability insurance marketable, as a policyholder with
finite wealth will be unwilling or unable to buy infinite wealth
33
protection. And policy limits also protect insurers against losses they
cannot bear in a cost-effective manner. Thus, insurance creates
economic value by enabling the risk-averse policyholder to incur a
certain cost (the insurance premium) in exchange for protection

28. Id. at 132.
29. Id.
30. E.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 522 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2008) (“By
cutting Federal Insurance out of the process, Arthur Andersen gave up any claim to
indemnity . . . .”); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos., 884 N.E.2d 1044, 1047–48 (N.Y. 2008)
(describing how Bear Stearns waived an indemnification clause by settling with the SEC without
Vigilant’s permission).
31. See infra Part I.C.
32. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 79.
33. Wealthy people will tend to buy more insurance coverage both because they can afford
more and because they have more to lose from an adverse verdict. See Alan O. Sykes, Judicial
Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers To Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique,
72 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (1994) (noting that liability policies have limits because “most
insureds have assets considerably less than the largest possible liability judgment they might
incur”).
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against the risk of a much larger, uncertain loss. The insurer, in turn,
pools this risk with uncorrelated risks from other policies that it sells,
thereby building a diversified portfolio of contingent liabilities whose
34
overall performance is predictable. But an insurer may be unable to
diversify against the risk of an especially large loss on a particular
policy and hence may use a policy limit to exclude the risk from its
liability portfolio.
A characteristic feature of the D&O insurance market is that
most public corporations do not buy all of their coverage from a
single insurer. Rather, they buy tiered coverage from several insurers,
35
constructing what is called an insurance “tower.” The tower’s
ground floor is occupied by the primary insurer, which bears the
initial costs of a lawsuit up to the primary policy limit. Above the
primary insurer is a first-layer excess insurer, which provides coverage
for losses greater than a specified amount, known as the
36
“attachment” point. The attachment point typically equals the policy
37
limit of the primary policy, making coverage continuous. Additional
layers of excess insurance can be stacked atop the first, creating a
column of policies that are exhausted in succession as the costs of a
lawsuit mount. Sitting atop the tower are the defendants themselves,
38
who bear any residual liability after all policies have been exhausted.
Towers with numerous stories are the norm: in 2008, public
companies with market capitalizations of at least $10 billion owned an
39
average of seven full layers of D&O coverage.
Why do corporations erect multi-insurer towers when they
seemingly could save on transaction costs by consolidating coverage
in a single policy? One commonly cited explanation for D&O towers
is that corporate managers want more liability coverage than any

34. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 131 (8th ed. 2011).
35. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 53.
36. Id. at 79.
37. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., No. 06C4554, 2010
WL 2542191, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2010) (describing a five-policy tower in which each excess
policy’s attachment point was the limit of the subsituated policy in the tower).
38. The defendants also have windows of exposure on lower levels if the policies have
deductibles.
39. According to survey data from Towers Watson, a risk-management consultancy, largecap companies had an average of 5.7 full excess policies, or 6.7 full policies when the primary
policy is included. Interestingly, the survey also found that 80 percent of those companies had
an additional, Side A-only policy that attached at the top of the stack of full policies. See
TOWERS WATSON, supra note 18, at 16 fig.21, 18 fig.22. As noted supra, note 16, Side A policies
cover directors and officers directly for any personal liability they incur.
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individual insurer is willing to sell. Thus, by covering only a portion
of a company’s potential liability, an insurer avoids the risk of a large
loss that the insurer cannot easily hedge through diversification. In
this way, towers are a substitute for reinsurance, an arrangement in
which an insurer sells a policyholder the desired amount of coverage
but then purchases from a “reinsurer” its own coverage for some or
41
all of its liability on the primary policy. The reinsurer is comparable
to an excess insurer, as it accepts the risk of losses beyond those that
the primary insurer is willing to bear. The converse explanation for
insurance towers is that the policyholders want to diversify their
coverage to protect themselves against the risk that an insurer will
fail. Evidence for this explanation is the fact that corporate managers
who are responsible for choosing their companies’ D&O insurers
rank “financial strength” among their most important selection
42
criteria.
Starting in Part II, this Article advances two additional
explanations for D&O towers—one benign, the other worrisome. The
benign explanation is that towers permit insurers to specialize by
focusing their coverage on discrete aspects of litigation risk.
Specialization in this form could create social wealth by enabling
insurers to reduce their operating costs, a benefit that would translate
into lower premiums.
The second, and more troublesome, explanation for insurance
towers this Article proposes is that towers create settlement conflicts
among insurers that serve the interests of corporate managers. Due to
the settlement obligations that courts place on liability insurers, these
conflicts increase the likelihood that the settlement of a shareholder
lawsuit will be paid by the defendant corporation’s D&O insurers
rather than by the corporation itself. Shifting liability for settlements
to insurers reduces the earnings volatility of those corporations whose
managers are sued. In this way, insurance towers camouflage the costs
of shareholder lawsuits resulting from managers’ conduct in office,
costs that shareholders ultimately bear. While this result is good for

40. E.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 53.
41. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 1.3(b)(2)
(1988) (“Reinsurance allows an insurer to secure adequate risk distribution by transferring part
of the risk to another insurer or group of insurers.”).
42. TOWERS WATSON, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY OF
RESULTS 26 fig.46 (2011), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3790/DandOSurvey_2011.pdf.

SQUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

14

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/17/2012 12:50 PM

[Vol. 62:1

the corporation’s managers, it harms diversified shareholders by
diminishing the value of a firm’s reported earnings as an indicator of
the amount of shareholder wealth created by that firm’s management
team. The next section lays a foundation for the discussion of these
additional functions of insurance towers by describing how conflicts
of interests among defense-side parties arise when settlements are
collective.
B. The Settlement-Trial Liability Gap
It is widely recognized among courts and commentators that
policy limits introduce a conflict of interests in settlement
43
negotiations. What these observers have not recognized is that
policy limits alone are not sufficient to produce this conflict. The
other necessary element is a presumption that any settlement will be
a collective resolution that binds all defense-side parties. When the
trial outcome is uncertain, the collective approach to settlements
drives a gap between the distribution of the settlement burden and
the distribution of the expected trial liability, biasing some defenseside parties in favor of settling and others against it.
The collective approach to settlements creates a conflict of
interests whenever the trial outcome is uncertain and the potential
damages—that is, the damages the plaintiff will win if he prevails at
trial—exceed the limit of the defendant’s primary liability policy. As
an illustration, consider a hypothetical lawsuit against an insured

43. See, e.g., Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 518–19 (Ct. App. 1973)
(describing how a policy limit can cause the interests of the “assured and carrier” to diverge);
see also Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Merritt, 110
Cal. Rptr. at 518–19); Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1138 (1954) (observing in the context of insurance with policy limits
that the “company and insured often have conflicting interests as to whether settlement should
be made”); Michael J. Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts
Between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 502, 503 (1992) (“The essence
of the conflict between the insurer and the insured inheres in the limits on indemnity provided
by typical liability policies.”); Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 259, 331 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (showing how policy
limits introduce conflict between insurers and policyholders); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith”
Refusal To Settle by Liability Insurers: Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof Problem, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 77, 77 (1994) (“[P]olicy limits create conflicts of interest between the insured and
the insurer in the conduct of litigation.”); Sykes, supra note 33, at 1346 (“Disputes over the
rejection of settlement offers by insurers would not arise absent provisions in insurance
contracts setting policy limits . . . .”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113,
1127 (1990) (describing how policy limits encourage insurers to reject reasonable settlement
offers and policyholders to accept unreasonable offers).
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defendant with a single, $2M liability policy. Assume that the
plaintiff has a 50 percent chance of winning $3M at trial and a 50
percent chance of winning nothing. Assume further that the
45
defendant has enough wealth to pay any above-limit damages. On
these assumptions, the actuarially fair settlement amount, meaning
46
the amount of the expected damages, is $1.5M. And settling for
$1.5M rather than going to trial would minimize the combined costs
47
to the defendant and the insurer, as trial would entail $1.5M in
expected damages plus additional litigation expenses that settlement
avoids.
Consider what would happen, however, if the plaintiff offered to
settle the case pre-trial for the actuarially fair amount.
Table 1. Liability When Expected Damages Within Primary Limit
Expected
Share of
Benefit (Cost)
Trial Liability Collective
of Collective
Settlement
Settlement
(Primary) Insurer,
$1.0M
$1.5M
($0.5M)
$2M limit
Defendant/Excess
$0.5M
$0M
$0.5M
Insurer
Total

$1.5M

$1.5M

—

The defendant would be happy if this case settled for $1.5M, which is
within the policy limit and hence would be paid entirely by the
insurer. If the case instead went to trial, there would be a 50 percent
chance of a $3M verdict, $1M of which would exceed the policy limit
and thus be the defendant’s responsibility. The defendant’s expected
trial liability therefore is $0.5M—that is, the expected damages above
the policy limit—plus the additional attorneys’ fees and other

44. A generalized model of insurer-policyholder conflict over settlements is provided in the
Appendix.
45. If personal assets are limited, the defendant’s exposure is the lesser of her net worth
and the above-limit damages. For a general analysis of settlement negotiations with a judgmentproof defendant, see Sykes, supra note 43.
46. (50% x $3M) + (50% x $0) = $1.5M.
47. Two implicit assumptions, which are not important to the points being illustrated, are
that the time-value of money is zero and that the insurer and defendant are risk-neutral. As in
all hypotheticals in the Article, this one also assumes a dichotomous set of trial outcomes,
meaning that the plaintiff is awarded either the potential damages or nothing.
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litigation expenses associated with trial. By contrast, her liability is
zero if the case settles for the actuarially fair amount. Thus, as Table 1
indicates, the benefit to the defendant of an actuarially fair settlement
relative to trial, in terms of liability only (that is, excluding defense
costs), is $0.5M.
To the insurer, on the other hand, trial is the cheaper option in
expected value terms. Although settlement would cost the insurer
$1.5M, trial presents expected liability of only $1M, equal to the
policy amount of $2M multiplied by the 50 percent chance of a verdict
for the plaintiff. Thus, the cost to the insurer of a fair settlement
relative to trial is $0.5M. Put another way, settling pre-trial for the
expected damages instead of going to trial shifts $0.5M in liability
from the defendant to the insurer, a shift the insurer will naturally
resist.
If the insurance policy covers not just liability to the plaintiff but
also defense costs such as attorneys’ fees, then the insurer will be
more inclined to settle pre-trial, as it will bear the defense’s trial
48
expenses. Unless, however, those expenses would be at least $1M,
the insurer will still be better off vetoing the actuarially fair
49
settlement offer. In this way, bundling defense coverage with
liability coverage only partly corrects the insurer’s underincentive to
settle.
The same structural conflict that makes the insurer too reluctant
to settle makes the defendant overeager to do so. To see why, assume
that the defense’s trial costs in the same hypothetical lawsuit would
be $0.4M and that the plaintiff demands a settlement payment of $2M
rather than the actuarially fair $1.5M. Now it is in the combined
48. If the case is a securities action, the insurer probably would not cover the fees of the
plaintiff’s attorneys, as federal securities laws lack fee-shifting provisions. In theory, a plaintiff’s
attorney could demand that a settlement include an amount for his fees and expenses. But
because these are sunk costs, it is not rational for him to insist upon their reimbursement as a
condition of settlement. On the other hand, derivative-suit settlements may include a provision
for attorneys’ fees if, as is typical, the relief granted is injunctive rather than monetary. See
Jessica M. Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1749, 1798 (2010) (finding that only about 10 percent of derivative-suit
settlements over the one-year period from July 2005 to June 2006 included a cash payment to
the corporation).
49. If the verdict is for the plaintiff, then the damages will exceed the policy limit, making
the defense costs the responsibility of the defendant. Therefore, in this hypothetical lawsuit the
insurer bears those costs only if the defendant wins at trial. If the defense’s trial expenses would
be $1M, then the insurer’s overall expected trial liability is (0.5 x $2M) + (0.5 x $1M) = $1.5M.
This analysis assumes that, as is standard in D&O policies, litigation expenses count toward the
policy limit. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 136.
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interest of the defense-side parties to reject the settlement demand,
which exceeds the expected damages plus the defense’s trial expenses.
Yet the defendant individually remains better off accepting the
50
plaintiff’s demand instead of going to trial, as the $2M settlement
would be fully covered by the insurer and would avoid the risk of an
51
above-limit damages award. If the defendant and plaintiff could
agree to enter into a settlement that bound the insurer, they might do
so for an amount that overcompensates the plaintiff relative to the
expected damages.
If the defendant were a public corporation, it probably would
have one or more excess insurance policies in addition to its $2M
52
primary policy. To reflect this possibility, the hypothetical could be
changed to assume that the defendant has a $3M excess policy to
supplement its $2M primary policy. The consequence of this change
would be that the excess insurer would step into the shoes of the
defendant as summarized in Table 1, facing the same potential
53
liability and thus being similarly biased toward pre-trial settlement.
Stated in general terms, defense-side parties on upper floors of an
insurance tower tend to be biased in favor of settling before trial, and
54
parties on lower floors tend to be biased against it.

50. See Syverud, supra note 43, at 1130 (“Regardless of the strength of Plaintiff’s claim of
liability, a rational Defendant might want to accept any proposed settlement that falls within the
[insurance] company’s share of the potential liability.”).
51. In this example, the defendant’s total expected trial liability is $0.9M if the insurance
policy provides liability coverage only. If the policy also provides defense coverage, then the
defendant bears the $0.4M in trial litigation costs only when the plaintiff prevails and hence the
total liability exceeds the policy limit. In such a case, the defendant’s total expected trial liability
is $0.7M.
52. See TOWERS WATSON, supra note 18, at 18 fig.22 (finding that corporations which buy
D&O insurance have an average of three full excess policies in addition to their primary policy).
53. See Syverud, supra note 43, at 1202 (observing how the excess insurer-primary insurer
conflict parallels the insurer-policyholder conflict when a settlement offer is within the primary
policy limit).
54. An analogy can be drawn to the conflict of interests between corporate creditors, who
prefer that the corporation pursue safe (low-variance) projects, and corporate shareholders,
who prefer risky (high-variance) projects. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky,
Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap
Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 215–18 (describing the creditor-shareholder conflict
over risk preferences). Defense-side parties toward the bottom of a tower are analogues to
corporate shareholders, as they prefer the high variance of outcomes offered by trial; defenseside parties toward the top of a tower are like corporate creditors, as they prefer the safety of
settlement.
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C. The Conflict-Control Devices Now in Use
At least three legal devices have been developed to address the
defense-side conflict of interests over settlements. One device has
already been mentioned: the bundling of defense coverage with
55
liability coverage. That device is only partially effective because, as
was illustrated by the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 1,
even when the insurer bears defense costs there will be cases in which
the insurer’s expected trial liability is less than its share of a pre-trial
settlement for the expected damages.
The other two conflict-control devices are a pair of quasicontractual duties that are placed on liability insurers. Both duties
require insurers to accept certain settlement offers even when doing
so is contrary to their private interests. One of these, known as the
“duty to settle,” arises when a plaintiff would be willing to settle
within or at the insurer’s policy limit. This duty is straightforward in
its implications and has been well analyzed in the academic
56
literature. Much less famous—yet more problematic—is the second
duty, which arises when the plaintiff makes a settlement demand
above the insurer’s policy limit and the defendant or an excess insurer
is willing to pay the above-limit portion. The question in such cases is
not, strictly speaking, whether the insurer has a duty to settle, but
rather whether it must “tender”—that is, contribute—its policy
amount in support of a settlement negotiated and partly funded by
another defense-side party. Courts have held that the answer often is
yes, thereby creating the duty that is termed here the “duty to
contribute.”
1. Settlement Demands Within the Policy Limit: The Duty To
Settle. The standard statement of the duty to settle is that a liability
insurer must agree to settle a case if it can do so for a reasonable

55. See supra text accompanying note 48.
56. E.g., Seth J. Chandler, Reconsidering the Duty To Settle, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 741 (1993);
David A. Hyman, Bernard Black & Charles Silver, Settlement at Policy Limits and the Duty To
Settle: Evidence from Texas, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 48, 49–52 (2011); Keeton, supra note
43, at 1137–48; Meurer, supra note 43, at 503–15; Charles Silver, Commentary, A Missed
Misalignment of Interests: A Comment on Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 77 VA. L. REV. 1585
(1991); Spier, supra note 43, at 331; Sykes, supra note 43, at 88–99; Sykes, supra note 33, at
1349–53; Syverud, supra note 43, at 1163–72.
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amount within its policy limit. The penalty for breach is forfeiture of
the limit, leaving the insurer responsible for the full damages award at
58
trial plus any other consequential damages. The duty has a
contractual basis: while liability policies typically require the
policyholder to seek the insurer’s consent before settling, they
59
provide that consent will not be “unreasonably withheld.” Courts,
however, impose the duty to settle even on those insurers that do not
assume it explicitly, most often by holding that the duty is an aspect of
60
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.
To determine whether an insurer breached the duty to settle,
courts ask whether “a prudent insurer without policy limits would
61
have accepted the settlement offer.” As a matter of theory this
approach has some appeal. Recall the earlier hypothetical lawsuit
(summarized in Table 1) in which the actuarially fair settlement
amount was $1.5M. Settling for that figure was in the combined
interests of the defendant and the insurer, as trial entailed that
amount in expected damages plus additional litigation expenses. Yet
if the insurer were to consider its financial interests alone, it might
reject a $1.5M settlement demand, as its policy limit causes its
expected trial liability to be only $1.0M. On the other hand, if its
policy lacked a limit, the insurer’s expected trial liability would be
$1.5M, making the insurer better off accepting a settlement demand
62
for that amount to avoid the expenses of trial. Thus, assuming that a
court would deem the $1.5M settlement demand reasonable, applying
the duty to settle would overcome the insurer’s structural disincentive

57. The courts of all but two states have explicitly recognized a duty to settle along these
lines. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS 9-146 & n.363 (3d ed.
2006 & Supp. 2010).
58. Id. at 9-147; see, e.g., Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 389 (Pa. 2001).
59. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting a common policy form) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
60. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 659 (Cal. 1999)
(“Pursuant to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied by law in every
liability insurance policy, the insurer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to settle a claim
against its insured by the insured’s victimwhich accords with the public policy favoring
settlements.” (citations omitted)); see also Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554,
556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the duty to settle “sounds in tort, not in contract”).
61. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); see also Wierck v. Grinnell Mut.
Reinsurance Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990) (“If, but for the policy limits, the insurer
would settle for an offered amount, it is obliged to do so . . . .”).
62. See Spier, supra note 43, at 331 (showing how the duty to settle aligns insurer and
policyholder interests).
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to settle and produce what appears to be the socially preferable
result.
Although courts consistently specify that the duty to settle only
requires insurers to accept settlement demands that are reasonable,
the duty would seem to serve its conflict-correction function even if
this qualification were dropped and the duty were triggered by any
63
settlement demand within the insurer’s policy limit. Under this
alternative, the prospect of uncapped trial liability would
automatically align the insurer’s interest with those of its
policyholder. For example, if the insurer in the hypothetical case
summarized in Table One faced unlimited trial liability, and the
defense’s trial expenses would be $0.4M, then the insurer would face
total expected trial costs (expected damages plus expenses) of $1.9M.
In that case the insurer would accept a pre-trial settlement demand of
$1.5M but not $2.0M, because if the plaintiff insisted on $2.0M then
the insurer would be better off going to trial. In this way, the duty to
settle is self-regulating, as it encourages insurers to accept actuarially
fair settlement demands but not those in which the plaintiff is
overreaching.
Based on similar reasoning, several commentators have
concluded that the duty to settle should be converted to a strictliability rule under which an insurer automatically forfeits its policy
limit whenever it rejects a settlement demand within that limit,
64
regardless of whether the demand is reasonable. This version of the
rule has two apparent advantages. It removes the structural conflict of
interests caused by the policy limit when the settlement demand is
within that limit, thereby avoiding strategic bargaining by the insurer
and the policyholder. And it further reduces litigation costs by
eliminating the need for follow-up lawsuits between policyholders
65
and insurers over the reasonableness of rejected settlement offers.
63. See, e.g., Hyman et al., supra note 56, at 79 (finding that a strict-liability rule “would
give insurers the right incentives to settle” and would “reduce litigation costs”); Sykes, supra
note 43, at 94–95 (finding that a duty to settle corrects the conflict of interests even when not
limited to settlement demands that are less than the expected damages).
64. See, e.g., Hyman et al., supra note 56, at 79; Keeton, supra note 43, at 1183–84; Victor
E. Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for an Insurer’s Failure To Settle: A Balanced Plan for an
Unresolved Problem, 1975 DUKE L.J. 901, 911; see also Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177 (Cal. 1967)
(collecting law review notes advocating a strict-liability rule).
65. See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177 (describing the benefits of a strict-liability version of the duty
to settle); Keeton, supra note 43, at 1183–84 (arguing that a strict-liability rule would reduce the
costs of duty-to-settle litigation); Schwartz, supra note 64, at 910 (same); Syverud, supra note 43,
at 1168 (same).
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Despite the apparent advantages of a strict-liability approach,
courts continue to subject the duty to settle to a reasonableness
66
standard. In practice, however, many insurers treat any settlement
67
demand within their policy limit as creating a high risk of liability.
These insurers probably fear hindsight bias: the duty to settle is
litigated only after a plaintiff has won an above-limit damages
68
award, at which point the insurer may find it difficult to convince a
judge or jury that the within-limit settlement demand that the insurer
previously rejected was unreasonable. Indeed, the California
Supreme Court has held that the mere fact of an above-limit damages
award supports an inference that accepting a pre-trial demand within
the limit would have been “the most reasonable method of dealing
69
with the claim.”
2. Demands Above the Cap: The Duty To Contribute. Scholars
who have analyzed the settlement conflict among liability insurers
and policyholders have focused on the fact pattern that triggers the
traditional duty to settle: a settlement offer within the policy limit.
Much less has been written about the nature of the conflict when the
70
plaintiff demands more. And next to nothing has been written about
how courts actually define insurer duties in above-limit demand
71
cases. One possible explanation for this lack of commentary is that
66. ROBERT JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 902 (3d ed. 2002).
67. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 292 (2001) (“Although the duty to settle is evaluated on a
reasonableness standard, the lawyers spoke as if it was subject to a strict liability standard. As a
result, once the plaintiff makes an offer to settle within limits, it appears that all the lawyers
involved assume that the insurance company will ‘make good’ on any judgment . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
68. The duty might also be invoked if the damages award is within the limit but the total
litigation costs—damages plus defense costs—exceed it.
69. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177. On the other hand, some courts have held that breaching the
duty to settle does not make the insurer responsible for punitive damages assessed against the
policyholder, as these are uninsurable as a matter of public policy. E.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 653, 652 (Cal. 1999).
70. Although several commentators have addressed above-limit settlement offers, they
have treated them as requiring only a simple extension of their analyses of below-limit offers,
and thus as raising no interesting new questions. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 43, at 108–10
(considering in an appendix the implications of imposing a settlement duty on insurers when the
settlement offer is above the policy limit and concluding “[a]lthough the details have changed,
the basic structure of the solution has not”); Syverud, supra note 43, at 1131 (finding that the
essential conflict of interests is the same regardless of whether the settlement demand is above
or below the policy limits).
71. The most extensive discussion of legal duties in this situation is provided by Professor
Robert Keeton, who devoted three pages to it in his fifty-one-page law review article on insurer
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the analysis of such cases seems, at least at first glance,
straightforward: the policyholder has paid for only a limited amount
of coverage, and so the insurer should be under no presumptive
72
obligation to settle for amounts above that limit. To hold otherwise
would effectively read coverage limits out of policies, which
ultimately would hurt policyholders by driving up insurance
premiums. It is probably for this reason that most judicial statements
of the duty to settle are careful to specify that the duty applies only to
73
within-limit settlement offers.
Matters become more complicated, however, when a settlement
demand is above the insurer’s policy limit but the defendant or an
excess insurer is willing to pay the above-limit portion. If the insurer
is asked to participate in such a settlement and refuses, what should
its liability be, if any? Strictly speaking, this fact pattern is not
encompassed by the traditional duty to settle, as the total settlement
is greater than the policy amount. Moreover, the consequences of
imposing a duty on the insurer in such a case are different in
important ways from those of the traditional duty to settle. For these
reasons, it is useful to have a separate term for the insurer’s
obligations in such a case, which is why this Article refers to a distinct
“duty to contribute.”
The duty to contribute almost never comes up in cases involving
personal liability coverage such as automobile and homeowners
74
insurance, as plaintiffs in such cases rarely try to settle for more than
the defendant’s policy limit. For the typical holder of, for example, a
personal automobile policy, the policy itself may be her most valuable

settlement duties. Keeton, supra note 43, at 1148–50. Those pages are concerned primarily with
the risks that the insurer faces when asking the policyholder to contribute to a settlement. This
Article’s focus, by contrast, is on the opposite fact pattern: when the policyholder or an excess
insurer asks the primary insurer to contribute. In his article on the duty to settle, Professor Alan
Sykes observed only that “[s]ome controversy exists [over] whether liability will attach when the
settlement offer exceeds the policy limits but the insured would have been willing to make up
the difference.” Sykes, supra note 43, at 98. His article thus does not countenance a duty to
contribute in the type of case in which the duty seems most often to arise: when the defendant
or excess insurer actually settles the case and then sues the primary insurer for the primary
policy amount. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
72. See Wierck v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 456 N.W. 2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990) (“It is
an extraordinary thing to require an insurer to pay more than the policy limits.”).
73. See, e.g., Jackson v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 136, 142 (Alaska 2004); Crisci, 426
P.2d at 176; Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Birth
Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 379 (Pa. 2001).
74. See, e.g., Hyman et al., supra note 56, at 61 & tbl.1 (finding in medical-malpractice cases
that a high percentage of final settlement demands are at or below the policy limit).
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recoverable asset: her home may be mortgaged to the bank, and her
other personal assets may be trivial. A plaintiff suing such a
policyholder for injuries covered by her policy will often be better off
demanding no more than her policy amount, thereby permitting the
plaintiff to negotiate exclusively with the liability insurer, an
experienced litigant who has deep pockets and who is accustomed to
75
reaching into them to end a lawsuit.
Fact patterns that implicate the duty to contribute are more
common in lawsuits against corporate defendants, as such defendants
often buy tiered liability coverage from multiple insurers. Tiered
coverage means that liability above the primary policy limit is borne
not by the defendants but rather by another insurer. It is thus
predictable that, in lawsuits against defendants protected by
insurance towers, the plaintiff often makes a demand that exceeds the
primary limit, thereby pulling at least one excess insurer into the
76
settlement negotiation. And the excess insurer and plaintiff may
then reach a settlement conditioned on the willingness of the primary
insurer, and any other subsituated excess insurers, to contribute their
policy amounts. The question of interest then becomes, what happens
if one (or more) of these lower-level insurers refuses to participate?
One possible outcome is that the proposed settlement falls apart and
the case goes to trial. Courts might then be tempted to hold that the
logic underpinning the traditional duty to settle extends to this fact
pattern as well, making the dissenting insurer liable for the full
damages award—including any portion outside its policy limits—if
77
the rejected settlement offer was reasonable. And this is in fact how
78
courts presented with this scenario have ruled.
75. For a model of settlement negotiations in which the insurer and policyholder are jointly
made better off by a clause in the insurance policy that credibly disables the policyholder from
contributing to a settlement, see Meurer, supra note 43, at 510.
76. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 145–47.
77. Commentators who see no legally relevant differences between above-limit and belowlimit settlement offers appear to have this particular fact pattern in mind. See supra note 70.
78. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that a primary insurer can be liable to an excess insurer for damages above the
primary limit if the primary insurer rejects an above-limit settlement demand on which the
excess insurer offered to pay the above-limit portion); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins.
Co., 886 F. Supp. 837, 839–40 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (applying Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 389 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)). A wrinkle is that the duty to settle is formally
owed to the policyholder, whereas excess insurers may be the main victims of a lower-level
insurer’s settlement veto. Most courts get around this technicality, which also comes up in
traditional duty-to-settle claims asserted by excess insurers against primary insurers, by holding
that an excess insurer is subrogated to the policyholder’s rights when another insurer’s bad faith
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The second potential outcome of such a settlement negotiation—
and the one that seems more common in practice—is that, after the
lower-level insurer refuses to participate, the excess insurer that
negotiated the settlement pays the full settlement out of its own
pocket and then sues the dissenting insurer for the latter’s policy
amount. In such cases, must the dissenting insurer, which in most
cases is the primary insurer, pay over its policy amount to defray the
costs of a settlement to which it did not consent? In the decisions that
have addressed this question directly, most courts have held that the
79
answer is yes. California courts in particular have consistently held
that the dissenting insurer’s duty to contribute in such cases is
80
essentially automatic. By contrast, opinions from other jurisdictions
hold that the dissenting insurer’s duty to contribute (again, not the
courts’ term) shares a common foundation with the duty to settle and
81
hence arises only if the overall settlement amount is reasonable.
Although none of the decisions recognizing a duty to contribute
says so explicitly, one possible rationale for the duty is that it, like the
duty to settle, counteracts the structural disincentive of lower-level
insurers to accept actuarially fair settlement demands. As an
illustration, consider again a hypothetical defendant who has a
primary liability policy of $2M and an excess policy of $3M. As
before, we will assume that the defendant faces a lawsuit in which the
plaintiff has a 50 percent chance of prevailing, but now we will
assume that the potential damages are $5M rather than $3M. In
causes the excess insurer to suffer a loss. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co., 792 P.2d 749, 752–53 & 752 n.2 (Ariz. 1990) (collecting such cases).
79. See, e.g., Westerholm v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 130 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165–68 (Ct. App.
1976); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Minn. 1976); Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 367 A.2d 864, 869 (N.J. 1976); Evans v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 245
P.2d 470, 479 (Wash. 1952); see also Pac. Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 667,
671–72 (Ct. App. 1966) (holding that an excess insurer which settled a case for a reasonable
amount within the primary policy limit could recover the full settlement amount from the
primary insurer). The only contrary holding is in the case of Sentry Ins. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.
Co., No. LF-2387-4, 2000 WL 288467, at *1–2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2000).
80. See, e.g., Pac. Indem. Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. at 671; see also Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 539 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying California law).
81. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund, 367 A.2d at 869; Evans, 245 P.2d at 479. Some courts
recognize a more expansive duty to contribute when the insurer in bad faith denies coverage or
refuses to defend its policyholder, in which case the policyholder may settle and then sue the
insurer to recover the full settlement amount, including any above-limit portion. See Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 627 (10th Cir. 1942) (“Some courts permit a
recovery by the assured against the insurer for losses sustained in excess of the limits of the
policy, based upon the negligent conduct of insurer, resulting in losses to the assured in excess of
the limits of the policy.”).

SQUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

9/17/2012 12:50 PM

COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS

25

contrast with the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 1, the
expected damages in this case ($2.5M) exceed the primary policy
82
limit.
Table 2. Liability When Expected Damages Exceed Primary Limit
Expected
Share of
Benefit (Cost)
Trial Liability Collective
of Collective
Settlement
Settlement
(Primary) Insurer,
$1.0M
$2.0M
($1.0M)
$2M limit
Defendant/Excess
$1.5M
$0.5M
$1.0M
Insurer
Total

$2.5M

$2.5M

—

To avoid trial expenses, the defense-side parties are collectively
better off settling pre-trial for the expected damages of $2.5M. And
the plaintiff prefers this result as well, for the same reason. But the
primary insurer will resist, as its liability would then be $2M (its
83
policy amount), whereas its expected trial liability is only $1M. To
overcome this obstacle to an insured settlement, a court might create
a rule under which the primary insurer forfeits its policy limit
whenever it refuses to participate in a settlement that requires it to
84
contribute no more than its policy amount. Alternatively, the court
could permit an excess insurer who settles the case for a “reasonable”
amount to recover the primary policy amount from the primary
insurer. In either of these forms, a duty to contribute placed on the
primary insurer seemingly moves settlement negotiations toward the
socially preferable result.
Professors Baker and Griffith have observed that excess D&O
insurers often put settlement pressure on the insurers below them in
an insurance tower, especially when the excess insurers are willing to
pay the portions of the settlement demand that fall within their slices
85
of the liability range. Court decisions recognizing a duty to
82. The Appendix contains a generalized model of insurer-policyholder conflict in abovelimit demand cases.
83. (50% x $2M) (the policy limit) + (50% x $0) = $1M.
84. Without a policy limit the insurer’s expected trial liability is $2.5M, the same as the
settlement offer, giving the insurer the necessary incentive to accept that offer, especially if the
insurer would also be responsible for the defense’s trial expenses.
85. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 149.
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contribute explain the source of this pressure. Objecting to settlement
is of little advantage to a lower-level insurer if the case will settle
anyway and a court then will force the insurer to pay over its policy
amount—plus, most likely, interest. And if its objection scuttles the
settlement, the insurer may be forced to pay the entire subsequent
damages award, including the portion above its policy limit.
Besides counteracting lower-level insurers’ bias against settling
when the trial outcome is uncertain, the duty to contribute may also
ameliorate a problem with collective settlements that can arise even
in cases in which the plaintiff has a 100 percent chance of prevailing at
trial. Settling such a case pre-trial confers a benefit on the insurers in
the tower that are responsible for liability in excess of the lawsuit’s
potential damages, as it is those insurers, rather than the insurers
below them, whose overall liability would be increased by the
litigation expenses that settlement avoids. Knowing that settlement
reduces the liability of these upper-level insurers, lower-level insurers
might strategically withhold their consent to settlement in order to
negotiate for a reduced share of the overall settlement burden. This
risk of holdouts, which constitutes a classic collective-action problem,
increases with the number of insurers in the tower. Strategic
negotiating of this type can introduce delay and cause negotiations to
86
collapse. The duty to contribute can be seen as a device for defeating
such holdouts and forcing them to pay their contractually assigned
share of the settlement burden.
The discussion to this point has considered only the apparent
virtues of the duty to contribute, one of which—counteracting lowerlevel insurers’ bias against settling—it shares with the duty to settle.
The implication might seem to be that the duty to contribute should
be governed by a strict-liability rule rather than a reasonableness
87
standard, just as scholars have advocated for the duty to settle. But
drawing this inference would be a mistake. As will be discussed in the
next Part, the duty to contribute lacks the duty to settle’s selfregulating virtue. Rather than discouraging plaintiff overreach, the
duty to contribute rewards it, producing a plaintiff-overcompensation
hazard that does not arise under the duty to settle even when that
duty is not restricted to “reasonable” settlement offers. This downside
of the duty to contribute raises the question whether the better
86. See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 359 (1991)
(describing how holdouts can cause negotiation breakdowns).
87. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
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solution to the conflict that arises from above-limit settlement offers
would be to eliminate the collective settlement process that is that
conflict’s source.
II. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DEFENSE-SIDE CONFLICT CONTROL
The previous Part described how the bundling of liability
coverage with defense coverage, the duty to settle, and the duty to
contribute all act against an insurer’s structural disincentive to settle
when the trial outcome is uncertain and the potential damages exceed
the insurer’s policy limit. None of these conflict-control devices
directly addresses the countervailing bias, which is the overeagerness
of defendants and upper-level excess insurers to settle pre-trial when
doing so would shift liability onto primary and lower-level excess
88
insurers. The implication is that the current set of conflict-control
devices increases the proportion of lawsuit settlements paid by lowerlevel insurers rather than by upper-level insurers and defendants. To
the extent that defendants are risk-averse, this shifting of their
89
liability onto insurers may seem efficient. But the conflict-control
devices achieve this result by introducing several costly distortions, all
of which are byproducts of the practice whereby defense-side parties
settle collectively.
A. Plaintiff Overcompensation Under the Duty To Contribute
Although scholarly commentary on insurer-policyholder conflict
in settlement negotiations has been extensive, it has overlooked how
the duty to contribute systematically encourages settlements that
90
overcompensate plaintiffs. And courts that enforce that duty seem
unaware of this hazard as well. Yet the hazard should be heeded, as
systematic plaintiff overcompensation will tend to generate a variety
of social costs including too many lawsuits, overspending on lawyers,
and, ultimately, more expensive liability insurance.

88. At least in theory, subjecting the duty to contribute to a reasonableness standard could
help countervail this bias toward pre-trial settlement. As noted, not all courts apply a
reasonableness standard in such cases. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
89. POSNER, supra note 34, at 131.
90. Other scholars have spoken of a plaintiff-overcompensation problem in connection
with the awarding of non-economic damages (such as punitive damages) for breach of the duty
to settle. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 56, at 744. The plaintiff-overcompensation hazard
described here, by contrast, arises specifically in duty to contribute cases, and occurs even if
economic (“compensatory”) damages are the only type available in the lawsuit.
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To see how the duty to contribute distorts negotiations in favor
of plaintiffs, consider again the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in
Table 2, in which the defendant has a $2M primary policy and a $3M
excess policy, and the plaintiff has a 50 percent chance of losing at a
trial and a 50 percent chance of winning $5M. Rather than assuming,
however, that the plaintiff makes an actuarially fair settlement
demand of $2.5M, consider what could happen instead if the plaintiff
made a more aggressive demand of $3M. In that case, it is cheaper in
expected value terms for the defense-side parties to go to trial, at least
91
as long as their trial expenses would be less than $0.5M. But from
the individual perspective of the excess insurer, accepting the $3M
settlement demand is still better than trial as long as it can use the
duty to contribute to force the primary insurer to tender its policy
amount of $2M. The excess insurer’s net settlement liability would
then be $1M, whereas its expected trial liability, as noted in Table 2, is
92
$1.5M (plus potential trial expenses). In this way, the duty to
contribute has what we might call a “cramdown” effect: it enables a
plaintiff and excess insurer (or defendant) to improve their positions
relative to trial by shifting liability down the tower onto the primary
insurer. The result in this hypothetical lawsuit is a settlement that
overcompensates the plaintiff relative to the expected damages.
A possible objection is that the plaintiff’s settlement demand of
$3M seems noncredible given that the expected damages are only
$2.5M. The excess insurer seemingly could negotiate the plaintiff
down to the actuarially fair amount, saving itself $0.5M. By the same
logic, however, the excess insurer’s rejection of the $3M settlement
demand is noncredible given that settling for that amount would cost
it only $1M, whereas its expected trial liability is at least $1.5M. The
plaintiff therefore should be able to negotiate the total settlement
amount up to $3.5M, thereby capturing the $2.5M in expected
damages plus the $1M potential benefit to the excess insurer of
avoiding trial. In fact, any settlement between $2.5M and $3.5M
would be mutually beneficial to the excess insurer and the plaintiff
93
relative to trial. And only at the bottom end of this range is the
plaintiff not overcompensated as measured by the expected damages.
91. Because the expected damages are $2.5M, trial is preferable to settlement as long as
trial costs would be less than $0.5M.
92. 50% x ($5M - $2M) = $1.5M.
93. Including defense costs widens the potential settlement range. For example, if the
plaintiff and the excess insurer would have to incur $0.2M each in trial costs, the settlement
range widens to $2.3M through $3.7M. This aspect of the negotiation dynamic is not, however,
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What is happening here is that the plaintiff and excess insurer are
bargaining to divide between themselves a $1M transfer away from
the primary insurer. The transfer equals the difference between the
primary insurer’s policy amount ($2M) and its expected trial liability
94
($1M). The transfer is available to the other parties to a collective
settlement, which is why the range of settlements mutually beneficial
to the plaintiff and excess insurer is $1M wide. Excluding trial
expenses, the transfer away from a primary insurer produced by the
duty to contribute, and hence the potential amount of plaintiff
overcompensation, can be expressed as follows:
(1)
(2)

If L < D, then T = L – pL
If L > D, then T = 0

where T is the transfer, L is the primary limit, D is the potential
damages (the damages award if the plaintiff wins at trial), and p is the
probability (between 0 and 1) of a verdict for the plaintiff. Equation
(1) states that, as long as the potential damages exceed the primary
limit, the transfer equals the primary limit minus the primary insurer’s
expected trial liability. Equation (2) states that no transfer will occur
95
if the potential damages do not exceed the primary limit. In that case
the excess insurer (or, in the absence of excess insurance, the
defendant) has no financial incentive to participate in a settlement,
96
and thus the duty to contribute will not normally be invoked.

particular to duty-to-contribute cases, as it applies to any negotiation in which the alternative to
settlement is trial. See Spier, supra note 43, at 330. For a fuller treatment, see the Appendix.
94. In theory, plaintiff overcompensation is also a hazard in the hypothetical illustrated in
Table 1, in which the expected damages of $1.5M are within the primary limit of $2M. The
excess insurer faces $0.5M in expected trial liability and therefore should be willing to settle for
as much as $2.5M as long as it can use the duty to contribute to force the primary insurer to pay
$2M. As the equations in the text indicate, plaintiff overcompensation is a possibility whenever
the potential damages exceed the primary limit—even if, as is true in Table 1, the expected
damages are within that limit. But the hazard is smaller in that instance because of the larger
gap between the expected damages and the minimum settlement demand that would bring the
excess insurer into the case. This gap makes it less likely that the plaintiff will be able to make a
credible settlement demand that entails liability for the excess insurer.
95. Including trial expenses would generally reduce the transfer by the defense’s trial
expenses multiplied by the probability of a verdict for the defendant. A more general formula
that includes trial expenses is derived in the Appendix.
96. The same consideration also means that the plaintiff must have a chance of prevailing,
i.e., p must be greater than 0. And p must be less than 1 for T to have a positive value. Thus, as
noted in Part I.B, the conflict of interest arises only if the trial outcome is uncertain.
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These equations have two worrisome implications from a socialwelfare perspective. The first is that the overcompensation hazard is
greatest in those cases that are the least meritorious. Our proxy for
merit is p, the plaintiff’s probability of winning at trial. If we hold L
(the primary limit) constant in Equation (1), T (the value transfer)
97
rises as p falls.
The second worrisome implication is that, if the defendant has
constructed an insurance tower, then the overcompensation hazard
increases with the number of policies in the tower. To see why, we
must first broaden the definition of L to signify not the primary policy
limit per se but rather the limit of whichever policy in the tower is
closest to the potential damages without exceeding them. The
equations remain valid with this modification because once any
excess insurer or the defendant agrees to a settlement that would fall
within its contractually allocated slice of the liability range, all
subsituated insurers (the primary insurer plus any lower-level excess
insurers) are collectively subject to the duty to contribute, and hence
are like a single primary insurer for purposes of calculating the value
transfer captured by the settlement.
With this adjustment in mind, two observations lead to the
conclusion that the overcompensation hazard rises with the number
of policies in the tower. First, note that if the plaintiff’s probability of
success (p) and the potential damages (D) are held constant, the
transfer (T) increases with the policy limit (L) as long as the limit
does not reach the potential damages. Put another way, the transfer is
largest when the distance between the potential damages and the
nearest underlying policy limit is smallest. Second, note that if the
defendant faces a set of possible lawsuits with potential damages that
are randomly distributed across the liability range encompassed by
the tower, then the expected distance between the potential damages
in any given suit and the nearest subsituated policy limit decreases as
the number of policies in the tower increases. In combination, these
observations mean that, if the total damages range covered by the
tower is held constant, then the potential for plaintiff
overcompensation increases with the number of policies in the tower.
97. For example, if we take the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 2 but assume that
p = 25% rather than 50%, then T is $1.5M rather than $1M. On that assumption, the actuarially
fair settlement amount is $1.25M, which is less than the excess policy limit. But the excess
insurer faces expected trial liability of $0.75M and therefore would be willing to accept any
settlement up to $2.75M as long as it can use the duty to contribute to defray its costs by the
$2M primary policy amount.
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When an excess insurer negotiates with a plaintiff to divide the
wealth transfer created by the duty to contribute, which of them will
have the stronger bargaining position? At least in the context of
shareholder litigation, there are reasons to think that both parties will
be under pressure to settle. Because the excess insurer will have sold
a diversified portfolio of policies, it may be more risk-neutral than the
plaintiff. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s settlement decision will
likely be made by a plaintiffs’ attorney, who may be part of a firm
that itself has a diversified set of pending lawsuits. In addition, the
excess insurer will probably be under strong settlement pressure from
the defendant-managers, who will want the lawsuit settled quickly.
Professors Baker and Griffith report that corporate managers desire
quick settlements of shareholder lawsuits, and are willing to tolerate
higher settlement amounts to attain them, in order to avoid ongoing
98
negative publicity. These observations suggest that plaintiffs and
excess insurers typically negotiate on roughly equal footing. If this
suggestion is correct, then settlement negotiations indeed are biased
strongly toward plaintiff overcompensation, which is avoided only if
the excess insurer has such a strong bargaining advantage that it
captures the entire value transfer for itself.
A question to be addressed at this point is whether the insurers
in a tower could prevent the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard by
bargaining among themselves after a lawsuit is brought. For example,
in the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 2, could the excess
insurer pay the primary insurer to accept responsibility for the excess
policy? Doing so would effectively collapse the primary and excess
policies into one, rendering the duty to contribute inapplicable and
eliminating the cramdown dynamic that leads to plaintiff
99
overcompensation. To transfer its policy to the primary insurer,
however, the excess insurer would need permission from the
policyholder under the common law rule that forbids a promisor
(here, the excess insurer) from delegating its obligations to a third
party (the primary insurer) without a “novation” from the promisee

98. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 155.
99. The primary insurer would be willing to accept responsibility for the excess policy for a
payment of as little as $0.5M, which is clearly better for the excess insurer than the hypothetical
$1M it would have to pay into a $3M settlement. The primary insurer presumably would then
settle the entire lawsuit with the plaintiff for the $2.5M in expected damages, giving it net
liability of $2M, the same as its liability in a cramdown settlement.
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100

(the policyholder). And the policyholder in our hypothetical would
have little reason to permit the transfer. Reassignment of policies
among insurers would defeat one of the main functions of insurance
towers, which is to reduce the policyholder’s exposure to each
101
insurer’s individual bankruptcy risk. Indeed, if the insurers in a
tower could freely reassign liability among themselves, they could
mutually profit by transferring all of their liability to the insurer who
is least creditworthy, which is the type of result that the novation rule
102
seems intended to avoid.
Alternatively, the primary insurer might try to prevent a
cramdown settlement by selling a reinsurance policy to the excess
insurer for the full excess-policy amount. Like an outright transfer of
the excess policy to the primary insurer, such a reinsurance policy
would seemingly consolidate liability in the primary insurer, but
without requiring a novation from the policyholder. Reinsurance by
itself would, however, only exacerbate the plaintiff-overcompensation
risk, as then the excess insurer would be fully insulated from liability
and hence have no incentive to refuse any settlement demand at all.
For this reason, a cramdown settlement could be avoided only if the
excess insurer bought a reinsurance policy from the primary insurer
and transferred to the primary insurer full authority to settle on
behalf of both insurers. But such a delegation of authority would
create a significant liability risk for the excess insurer, as courts have
consistently held that an insurer cannot use reinsurance to relieve
103
itself of the duty to settle it owes its policyholder. This rule against
100. ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 939–40 (2d
ed. 1993) (“An effective delegation does not discharge an obligor until contracted performance
is provided by the delegate. A discharge may result, however, if the parties engage in a
novation.”).
101. See TOWERS WATSON, supra note 42, at 26 (finding that purchasers of primary D&O
insurance identify “financial strength” as the most important insurer selection criterion).
102. Imagine that Insurer A could sell a given policy for a $100 premium but Insurer B, due
to credit risk, could sell the same policy for only $50. The two could mutually gain at the
expense of a policyholder if Insurer A sold the policy for $100 and then paid Insurer B $75 to
assume it.
103. Royal Transit, Inc. v. Ctr. Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1948); Zumwalt
v. Utils. Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Mo. 1950); accord Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins.
Co., No. 88 CIV.0789 (RWS), 1990 WL 102879, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1990) (“[A]n insurer
owes to its insured a good faith obligation to make coverage determination[s] without regard to
whether or not the risk is reinsured.”); see also STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS:
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 4:20 (2d ed. 1997) (“In the reinsurance context . . . the primary
insurer does not relinquish control to the reinsurer . . . .”); Keeton, supra note 43, at 1150 (“As
between [insurance] company and insured, the company cannot escape any of its responsibilities
by reinsurance.”). Could an excess insurer that has delegated control over settlement
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delegation of settlement authority is consistent with the novation rule,
as both protect the policyholder from actions by an insurer that might
deprive the policyholder of the full benefits of the insurance contract.
Going a step further, the excess insurer could try to include a
clause in its policy that expressly permitted it to delegate settlement
authority to another insurer. But there is reason to doubt that
corporate managers would be willing to buy a D&O policy that
contained such a clause. As will be discussed in Part IV, managers
have a strong incentive to preserve the duty to contribute’s cramdown
dynamic in order to encourage insurer-covered settlements even
when the total settlement amount exceeds the expected damages.
Therefore, ex post bargaining among insurers in a tower—that is,
bargaining that occurs after a lawsuit is filed—does not seem to be a
viable solution to the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard created by
the duty to contribute.
Although they seem unable to bargain around cramdown
settlements ex post, insurers can adjust to the risk of such settlements
ex ante by charging higher premiums. The burden of the higher
premiums is ultimately borne by the shareholders of the corporations
that buy the insurance. For this reason, corporate shareholders,
despite being the plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits, derive no net
benefit from systematic plaintiff overcompensation in such cases.
Rather, the lawsuits benefit shareholders only if they deter
managerial misconduct in a cost-effective manner, a result that
104
excessive settlements will tend to undermine. And if the damages
set by the legal system already overstate the actual costs of the
underlying managerial conduct—as is likely the case in securities class
105
actions —then excessive settlements will only exacerbate the
problem.
While the actual plaintiffs in shareholder litigation do not
generally benefit from excessive settlements, the same cannot be said

negotiations to the primary insurer also seek indemnification from the primary insurer for its
liability to the policyholder under the duty to settle? According to Professor Keeton, that
question is a “close” one, raising doubts about whether the excess insurer in our hypothetical
would be willing to run that chance. Keeton, supra note 43, at 1151.
104. The overdeterrence hazard is blunted to the extent that D&O insurers fail to adjust
premiums for firm-specific risk. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 77–84.
105. See Amanda Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1679, 1702 (2011) (arguing that damages in fraud-on-the-market class actions overstate the net
social costs of the fraud).
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for their attorneys, who are paid on contingency. This boon for
plaintiffs’ attorneys comes at the expense of social wealth, as it
encourages the filing of marginal lawsuits that the attorneys deem
worthwhile only because of the possibility of an excessive settlement.
The costs of these suits are like a tax on shareholder returns and
hence discourage capital formation.
Importantly, the duty to settle does not produce a plaintiffovercompensation hazard analogous to that caused by the duty to
contribute. If an insurer believes that a within-limit settlement
demand is greater than the expected damages plus any trial expenses
the insurer would bear, then the insurer is better off rejecting the
demand and going to trial, even if by doing so it breaches the duty to
107
settle and hence forfeits its policy limit. This is the duty to settle’s
self-regulating virtue mentioned earlier: the fact that the duty, even
when not subject to a reasonableness standard, cannot be used to
force an insurer to settle for more than the insurer’s estimate of the
lawsuit’s value.
As the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in Table 2 illustrates, the
duty to contribute does not share this virtue. Thus, whatever the
merits of applying a strict-liability rule to the duty to settle, the
analysis here shows that applying the same rule to the duty to
contribute would be a mistake. Insurers who refuse to participate in
above-limit settlements need some means for vindication, as
otherwise excess insurers or policyholders will collude with plaintiffs
to force the dissenting insurers to pay for settlements that
overcompensate the plaintiffs and hence are socially inefficient.
Fortunately, some duty-to-contribute precedent holds that the duty is
108
breached only if the settlement amount was reasonable. But this
solution is hardly ideal: enforcing this standard requires follow-up
litigation over the reasonableness of settlement amounts, which

106. Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries
and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1251; Jeffrey Michael Smith, The Role of the
Attorney in Protecting (and Impairing) Shareholder Interests: Incentives and Disincentives To
Maximize Corporate Wealth, 47 DUKE L.J. 161, 167 n.44 (1997).
107. An exception occurs where the insurer is responsible for the defense’s trial costs and
those costs are greater than the difference between the settlement demand and the expected
damages. For example, if the expected damages are $1.5M, the defense’s trial expenses are
$0.3M, and the plaintiff demands $1.7M, it would be cheaper for the insurer to accept the
demand than to go to trial.
108. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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besides being costly may often be distorted by a pro-settlement bias
among courts that makes overcompensation more likely.
B. Insurer Underspecialization
The previous section described what is probably the most
important distortion produced by the duty to contribute: a wealth
transfer that biases settlements toward plaintiff overcompensation.
But there is a second distortion produced by that duty, and by the
duty to settle as well, which is the compression of settlement burdens
on primary insurers in a manner that may interfere with insurer
specialization.
As a general matter, shareholder lawsuits that present
meaningful liability risks can be divided into two types: high-merit
suits that the plaintiff has a high probability of winning at trial, and
long-shot suits that the plaintiff has a low probability of winning but
that entail high potential damages. By developing expertise in
covering one lawsuit type or the other, insurers might be able to
appraise risk more accurately, thereby permitting them to operate
with smaller loss reserves. And this reduction in the insurers’
109
operating costs would, in turn, lead them to charge lower premiums.
But the duties to settle and contribute impede such specialization
because they force insurers on lower stories of an insurance tower to
bear most of the burden from both types of lawsuit.
Insurance towers already seem to reflect a degree of insurer
specialization, as there are several D&O insurers that sell excess
110
policies only. These insurers presumably have developed a measure
of expertise in pricing the risk of lawsuits with high expected
damages. Without the duties to settle and contribute, however, the
opportunity for specialization would be greater. To see why, imagine
a corporation with a D&O tower that consists of a $2M primary
policy, a $3M first-layer excess policy, and a $5M second-layer excess
policy. Imagine further that the corporation faces the risk of a longshot suit with $10M in potential damages and a 10 percent probability
of a verdict for the plaintiff. At first glance, the risk of this type of
lawsuit seems to be the reason for the second-layer excess policy. But

109. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 79 (noting that insurers which fail to assess
policy risks accurately will have higher risk-related expenses).
110. Although many companies sell excess D&O policies, the market for primary policies is
dominated by just two, AIG and Chubb. Id. at 53.
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note that the actuarially fair settlement amount is only $1M, well
within the primary policy limit. And the duty to settle would require
the primary insurer to accept a settlement demand of $1M even
though the primary insurer’s expected trial liability is only $0.2M,
112
excluding defense costs. Similarly, if the probability of a verdict for
the plaintiff were 30 percent rather than 10 percent, the primary
insurer would still bear the bulk of the settlement burden via the duty
113
to contribute. In either case, the lawsuit’s settlement burden is
concentrated on the primary insurer even though the potential
damages reach the top of the tower.
This example suggests that insurance towers entail a large
amount of risk compression. Because of the duties to settle and
contribute, lower-story insurers bear most of the risk from both highmerit lawsuits and long-shot lawsuits. For this reason, towers might be
conceptualized as having a pyramidal shape, with wide bases and
progressively thinner upper floors. As will be described in Part III.B,
risk compression would be eliminated if settlements were segmented,
which would shift much of the settlement burden of long-shot lawsuits
114
up the tower to the excess insurers.
C. Overspending on Defense Lawyers
As was observed in Part I.B, there is a third legal device that
works against the structural disincentive of lower-level insurers to
settle: the bundling of coverage for liability with coverage for defense
115
costs. But bundling also encourages overspending on defense
lawyers because of the moral hazard that arises when the parties who
hire the lawyers—namely, the manager-defendants—are not the
parties paying them. Defense costs are a significant portion of the
financial burden imposed by shareholder litigation: Professors Baker
and Griffith estimate that defense costs in the typical shareholder suit
111. 10% (the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x $10M (the damages award if the
plaintiff prevails) = $1M.
112. 10% (the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x $2M (the policy limit) = $0.2M.
113. If the potential damages remained $10M but the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff
were 30 percent, then the primary insurer’s expected trial liability would be only $0.6M, equal to
30% (the chances of a verdict for the plaintiff) x $2M (the policy limit). But the actuarially fair
settlement amount would then be $3M, of which $2M would likely be the primary insurer’s
responsibility if the case settled and the excess insurers were able to use the duty to contribute
to force the primary insurer to pay its full policy amount.
114. Note that, in the lawsuit summarized in Table 2, segmenting the settlement process
would shift $1M in expected liability from the primary insurer to the excess insurer.
115. See supra Part I.B.
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116

equal about 30 percent of the settlement amount. And even when a
case is dismissed rather than settled, the defendants may have to incur
117
large legal bills to achieve that result.
Besides explaining bundling, the conflict of interests created by
collective settlements also helps explain why D&O insurance appears
to rely less than other types of liability insurance on deductibles and
co-payments. These features of insurance policies reduce moral
hazard by causing policyholders to bear more of the costs of their
118
decisions that result in covered losses. In the D&O context, they
could be used to discourage managers from overspending on defense
lawyers. And, indeed, when D&O policies do employ these incentivecorrection devices, corporate managers tend to spend much less on
119
their own defenses. But these curatives are often not used, at least
120
at effective levels. Instead, the main way that D&O insurers seem to
protect themselves against overspending on defense attorneys is
simply to charge higher premiums. The implication is that the
corporate managers who buy D&O insurance think that encouraging
insurers to accept plaintiff settlement demands is more important
than keeping insurance premiums down.
To be sure, liability coverage creates moral hazard as well, as it
weakens managers’ incentive to avoid the types of conduct that result
in shareholder lawsuits. But this moral hazard is more attenuated due
to the delay between the conduct and the lawsuit and because even
the most scrupulous managers cannot eliminate their risk of being
sued altogether. These observations imply that defense coverage and
liability coverage should have different structures. But instead they
are typically merged under a single D&O policy and subject to the
same deductible, if any. Were it not for lower-level insurers’
structural disincentive to settle, this degree of bundling would be
unnecessary and overall defense costs would be lower.

116. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 134–35.
117. Although defense costs are not true fixed costs, they are less variable than the potential
damages in shareholder lawsuits, making insurance for them less economically valuable as a
risk-spreading device. Thus, Professors Baker and Griffith find that the ratio of a lawsuit’s
defense costs to its settlement amount tends to fall as the settlement amount rises. Id.
118. Jacob Loshin, Note, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable
Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 506 (2007).
119. For a vivid description of how defendants in shareholder lawsuits behave differently
depending on whether an insurer is covering their legal bills, see BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra
note 1, at 135–36.
120. Id.
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The fact that the manager-defendants rather than the insurers
control the defense of the typical shareholder lawsuit also helps
explain a second unusual structural feature of D&O insurance. In
most automobile and homeowners policies, the policy limit applies to
121
liability coverage only. Defense coverage is unlimited, which makes
sense given that the insurer rather than the policyholder controls the
defense and hence is unlikely to spend more on defense attorneys
122
than is justified by the expected damages. The typical D&O policy,
by contrast, is a “burning candle” arrangement in which defense costs
123
and liability costs count cumulatively toward the same policy limit.
In a liability-insurance market in which buyers want defense coverage
but also want to control their defenses, using the policy limit to cap
coverage for defense costs may be the insurers’ only practical means
of reining in spending on defense lawyers.
III. ELIMINATING THE STRUCTURAL CONFLICT THROUGH
SEGMENTED SETTLEMENTS
The last Part described the distortions caused by the three
devices that have been developed to encourage settlements by
insurers. These distortions occur because the devices fail to correct
the defense-side conflict of interests at its source, which is the
mismatch between settlement liabilities and expected trial liabilities
that arises when the trial outcome is uncertain and settlements are
collective. As long as that mismatch persists, defense-side parties will
have an incentive to reduce their liability by shifting losses onto each
other rather than by pursuing settlements that minimize the total
costs of a lawsuit. Only the duty to settle comes close to correcting the
124
mismatch, but it does so by selectively disregarding policy limits.
And policy limits serve valuable functions such as protecting insurers
against risks that are too large for them to bear in a cost-effective

121. See, e.g., INS. SERVS. INC., HOMEOWNERS 3 (SPECIAL FORM), app. A at 16 (1999),
available at http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/3808/3900110/appendices/AppendixA.pdf
(capping coverage for personal liability but assuming an uncapped duty to defend); ISO PROPS.,
INC., PERSONAL AUTO POLICY, app. B at 2 (2003), available at http://wps.aw.com/wps/
media/objects/3808/3900110/appendices/AppendixB.pdf (same).
122. Interestingly, the moral hazard here goes the other way: the insurer bears damages
liability only up to the policy limit, and thus faces an incentive to underinvest in defending cases
in which the potential damages exceed that limit.
123. In re Enivid, Inc., 364 B.R. 139, 143–44 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007); In re Metro. Mortg. &
Sec. Co., 325 B.R. 851, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005).
124. See supra Part I.C.1.
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manner. Meanwhile, the duty to contribute exacerbates incentives for
strategic behavior by forcing insurers to pay into settlements that
were negotiated between the plaintiff and another insurer or the
defendant. Finally, bundling defense coverage with liability coverage
substitutes one externalization problem for another: by curbing the
insurer’s power to shift liability for damages onto the defendant, it
encourages overspending on lawyers by permitting the defendant to
shift defense costs to the insurer.
This Part describes how segmented settlements would remove
the defense-side structural conflict of interests, thus mitigating or
eliminating each of the distortions that arise when settlements are
collective. Segmented settlements would supersede the duties to
settle and contribute, and they would reduce the need to bundle
defense coverage with liability coverage. Segmentation is also more
efficient than other settlement approaches that scholars have
discussed, including a strict-liability rule for the duty to settle and
“vertically” sliced insurance towers.
A. The Mechanics of Segmented Settlements
Under the prevailing method for structuring D&O coverage, a
range of potential damages in shareholder lawsuits is divided into
segments, and each segment is contractually assigned to a different
insurer. Any damages beyond that range are by default the
responsibility of the defendants, whose potential liability also forms a
segment capped at the amount of the defendants’ wealth. Under the
collective approach to settlements, no settlement can be reached
unless all of the implicated defense-side parties either consent or are
forced to contribute. Under a segmented approach, by contrast, each
defense-side party would have the authority to settle its own liability
segment with the plaintiff, and in doing so would neither require
permission from other defense-side parties nor be able to force them
to participate.
To see how the segmented approach would work, consider again
the lawsuit summarized in Table 1, in which the plaintiff’s probability
of winning at trial is 50 percent, the potential damages are $3M, and
the defendant has a $2M primary policy and a $3M excess policy.
Recall that the lawsuit’s expected damages are $1.5M, which given
the policy limits break down into expected trial liability of $1M for
the primary insurer, $0.5M for the excess insurer, and zero for the
defendant. Under a segmented approach, the plaintiff would make
separate settlement demands to each defense-side party, presumably
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based on their respective expected trial liabilities. If only the primary
insurer settled, trial would occur, and a verdict for the plaintiff would
entitle him to collect only those awarded damages in excess of the
$2M primary limit. The first $2M in damages would be uncollectable,
as the plaintiff would have waived his right to collect these in
exchange for whatever settlement payment he received from the
125
primary insurer. Conversely, if only the excess insurer settled, trial
again would occur, but the plaintiff would be able to collect only the
126
first $2M of the damages award, to be paid by the primary insurer.
The additional $1M in potential damages would be uncollectable, as
the plaintiff in settling with the excess insurer would have waived his
right to collect any awarded damages that fell within the excess
insurer’s segment of the tower. If both insurers settled, the only
remaining defense-side party would be the defendant, but on these
assumptions the plaintiff has no reason to go to trial against the
defendant alone since the potential damages do not reach the
defendant’s liability segment. The defendant and plaintiff would thus
have found it to be in their mutual interest to settle the defendant’s
liability segment early in the case for no payment or perhaps a
nominal amount.
Note that the actuarially fair total settlement amount for this
case remains $1.5M. What has changed is the distribution of that
amount among the defense-side parties. Now there is no mechanism
by which one defense-side party can, by rejecting an actuarially fair
settlement offer, expose other defense-side parties to the risk of a
damages award at trial. As a result, there is no longer a difference
between the distribution of the expected trial liability and the
distribution of the settlement burden. The structural conflict of
interests is eliminated: the primary insurer is no longer
undermotivated to settle before trial, and the excess insurer is no
longer overeager to do so. The justification for the duties to settle and

125. Importantly, the size of the waiver would be the amount of the settling insurer’s policy,
not the amount of the settlement payment. Otherwise, the segmented approach could produce
its own plaintiff-overcompensation hazard analogous to that which arises in settlements
involving defendants with joint and several liability. See Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on Joint and
Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 559, 562 (1994)
(describing how a plaintiff can extract total settlement payments that exceed the expected
damages when settling with multiple defendants whose liability is joint and several, as long as
the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing at trial is less than 100 percent).
126. As under current practice, the jury would have no knowledge of the insurance
arrangement, FED. R. EVID. 411, or of prior settlements, id. 410.
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contribute—both of which counteract the structural bias of lower127
level insurers against settling—has been eliminated.
In the absence of judicial resistance, the possibility of which is
discussed Part IV.A, settlements could be segmented contractually.
Liability policies would specify that the insurer and policyholder are
permitted to settle separately, subject to the condition that the insurer
can settle only if the plaintiff agrees to waive his right to collect from
the policyholder any damages that would be covered by that insurer’s
policy. The policyholder and the other liability insurers would be
third-party beneficiaries of this waiver and hence able to enforce it.
As for coverage for defense costs, segmented settlements are
compatible with bundled D&O policies as they are now written. If
settlements were segmented and defense and liability coverage
continued to be linked, insurance policies presumably would specify
that an insurer that settles its own liability segment has no continuing
obligation to cover defense costs either. This would be the sensible
rule, as it would make defense-side parties who hold out internalize
the trial costs that result from their refusal to settle. There is,
however, no reason to assume a static liability-insurance market:
segmenting settlements would almost certainly cause at least a partial
decoupling of defense coverage from liability coverage, as is
described in the next section.
B. Segmentation’s Economic Benefits
The segmented approach to settlements is superior to the
conflict-control devices now in use because it respects policy limits
while removing the structural conflict that those limits introduce
when settlements are collective. One clear benefit of the segmented
approach would be the elimination of the systematic plaintiffovercompensation hazard caused by the duty to contribute. That duty
would lose its justification and hence would be discarded. As an
illustration, consider again the hypothetical lawsuit summarized in
Table 2, in which the potential damages are $5M, the plaintiff has a 50
percent chance of winning at trial, and the defendant has a $2M
primary policy and a $3M excess policy. As in Part II.A, we will
consider what happens when the plaintiff makes an aggressive

127. Deductibles could also be accommodated without complication. If, for example, the
primary policy had a deductible, then the defendant would be responsible for both the
bottommost and topmost liability slices in the tower, which it could negotiate to settle
separately or as a package.
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settlement demand of $3M. Putting aside for a moment the question
of trial costs, a risk-neutral uninsured defendant would reject that
demand because the expected damages are only $2.5M. But because
the excess insurer faces expected trial liability of $1.5M, it prefers a
$3M settlement to trial as long as it can use the duty to contribute to
force the primary insurer to tender its policy amount of $2M. If
settlements were segmented, however, this outcome could no longer
occur. The plaintiff would have no hope of collecting $3M in total
settlement money, as the primary insurer would not settle for more
than $1M (its expected trial liability), the excess insurer would not
settle for more than $1.5M (its own expected trial liability), and there
would be neither an incentive nor a mechanism for one insurer to
force the other to pay more.
Once trial expenses are factored in, the possibility arises that the
defense-side parties in combination might be willing to settle for more
than the total expected damages to avoid trial. But settling avoids
trial expenses for the plaintiff as well, which means that he may be
willing to settle for less than the expected damages. The fact that the
common desire to avoid trial expenses creates a range of possible
settlement amounts remains true regardless of whether the settlement
approach is collective or segmented. The relevant point here is that
the collective approach shifts that range upward—that is, in favor of
the plaintiff—by the amount of the wealth transfer produced by the
128
cramdown effect of the duty to contribute. Segmented settlements
eliminate that shift, lowering the settlement range so that it centers
around the expected damages, as is true in the absence of liability
129
insurance.
By eliminating the systematic plaintiff-overcompensation hazard
caused by the duty to contribute, segmentation not only would reduce
total settlement amounts, but it also would weaken the incentive for
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits of marginal merit. Total litigation costs
would fall for the additional reason that there would no longer be
follow-up suits over the reasonableness of rejected settlement
demands. This last benefit is enhanced by the fact that segmented
settlements would also eliminate the need for the duty to settle, which
130
under current law is similarly subject to a reasonableness standard.

128. A simple model that depicts this shift is provided in the Appendix.
129. See Spier, supra note 125, at 561 (modeling settlement negotiations in the absence of
insurance).
130. See supra Part I.C.1.
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Each of these changes would reduce the cost of D&O insurance, to
the ultimate benefit of shareholders.
A possible concern with the segmented approach described here
is that it would redistribute liability up the insurance tower, seemingly
increasing liability for policyholders. This possibility can be seen in
the previous example if we assume there is no excess insurer; in that
case, the defendant’s share of an actuarially fair settlement is $0.5M
under current practice but $1.5M under the segmented approach.
Such a liability shift seems to undermine the economic function of
insurance, which is to transfer risk from a policyholder to an insurer
131
that through diversification can bear the risk more easily. But this
analysis ignores how parties would respond contractually to a change
in the settlement rules. If segmented settlements became the norm,
policyholders would adapt by erecting higher insurance towers, which
they could afford to do because segmentation would eliminate risk
compression and hence make the policies toward the bottom of the
tower cheaper. Note how segmentation reduces the primary insurer’s
settlement liability in the previous hypothetical from $2M to $1M.
The primary insurer would respond to the reduction in its expected
liability by charging a lower premium, and the policyholder could use
the savings to raise the limit on that policy or to buy another excess
policy. In general terms, segmented settlements would make the
bases of insurance towers “thinner,” as lower stories would bear less
weight from potential damages at higher levels. And this change
would, in turn, allow towers to be taller without making them more
expensive to construct.
Eliminating risk compression would also promote insurer
specialization and thereby allow for more accurate pricing of
litigation risk. As noted in Part II.B, collective settlements conflate
insurance coverage for two distinct types of lawsuit: high-merit suits
that the plaintiff would be likely win at trial, and long-shot suits that
the plaintiff would be less likely to win but that have high potential
damages. The duties to settle and contribute concentrate the
settlement burden of both lawsuit types on lower-story insurers.
Segmented settlements would shift much of the settlement burden of
the long-shot lawsuits up the tower. And this shift in settlement
burdens would encourage specialization by producing greater
separation between the settlement burden from suits with low
potential damages, which would continue to be focused on lower131. POSNER, supra note 34, at 131.
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level insurers, and the burden from long-shot suits with high potential
damages, which would be more concentrated on the excess insurers
on upper floors.
A further benefit of segmented settlements is that they would
reduce spending on defense lawyers by decreasing the need to bundle
defense coverage with liability coverage as a mechanism for
overcoming lower-level insurers’ structural disincentive to settle. As
was described in Part II.C, bundling encourages overspending on
lawyers due to the moral hazard that arises when the corporate
managers run their defense but their insurers pay for it. If lower-level
insurers’ bias against settling were eliminated, defense coverage could
make more aggressive use of deductibles, copayments, and other
devices for managing the overspending hazard. The net result would
be lower overall defense costs and hence, through lower premiums,
higher profits for shareholders.
There is one scenario in which full bundling would probably
persist: when the corporation and its managers have settled out of the
lawsuit but at least one insurer has declined settlement and opted for
trial. We can predict that liability policies would be written so that the
nonsettling insurers in such cases bore the defense’s trial expenses
132
without regard to policy limits, as otherwise those insurers could
externalize onto other defense-side parties some of the costs of their
133
refusal to settle. Notably, as each insurer settles out of the case, the
burden of the trial expenses would be increasingly focused on the
remaining insurers, thereby strengthening their incentives to settle as
well. This dynamic is the opposite of the typical holdout problem, in
which each party who joins the collective resolution strengthens the
134
bargaining position of the holdouts who remain. Moreover, each
separate settlement would also increase the plaintiff’s incentive to

132. The policyholders presumably would still control the defenses in such cases, thus
avoiding the conflict of interests that would arise from coverage exclusions if the insurers were
in charge. For this reason, the moral hazard that encourages overspending on defense attorneys
would persist, albeit in a more limited context. Strictly speaking, this particular social cost of
D&O insurance does not result from the structural conflict that segmented settlements would
eliminate, as it would occur even if liability policies had no limits. Rather, this cost is a
byproduct of the insistence by insured defendants on running their own defenses in shareholder
lawsuits.
133. If multiple insurers remained in the case, the allocation rule might be that the litigation
expenses would all fall on one insurer—perhaps the lowest-ranked insurer in the tower that
remains. Such a rule would maximize that insurer’s incentive to settle, which would then shift
the expected trial liability to the next insurer, and so on.
134. For a general description of holdout dynamics, see Cohen, supra note 86, at 354–59.
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settle with remaining defense-side parties, as each settlement would
reduce the amount the plaintiff could win at trial but not his likely
trial expenses.
C. Other Reform Proposals: Strict Liability and Vertically Sliced
Towers
Two other approaches to alleviating insurer-policyholder conflict
have been discussed by scholars. Neither, however, fully eliminates
the source of that conflict, and thus neither would go as far as the
segmented approach in reducing the costs of the current system. The
first approach has already been mentioned: converting the duty to
settle into a strict-liability rule under which an insurer automatically
forfeits its policy limit whenever it rejects a within-limit settlement
135
demand, regardless of the demand’s reasonableness. This proposal’s
main virtue is that it would reduce the need for follow-up lawsuits
between insurers and policyholders, which besides generating direct
136
litigation costs present a risk of legal error. But the proposal has an
overlooked downside, which is that it would increase risk
compression on primary insurers and hence further undermine
137
insurer specialization. Moreover, as long as settlements remain
collective, a reasonableness standard will still be needed in duty-tocontribute cases in order to police the plaintiff-overcompensation
hazard. For these reasons, making the duty to settle a strict-liability
rule would not be as efficient as segmented settlements, which
remove the structural conflict that makes such a duty necessary in the
first place.
A second approach to liability insurance, which is used in
138
Europe, is called the “quota share” system. Insurance towers are
sliced vertically rather than horizontally, meaning that each
participating insurer, instead of assuming all liability within its
exclusive segment of the liability range, accepts a percentage of the
liability range covered by the tower as a whole. For example, four
liability insurers might agree with a policyholder that each insurer will
cover 25 percent of the liability and defense costs, up to a common
limit of $10M per lawsuit. The main apparent advantage of this
approach is that, among the insurers themselves, there is no longer a
135.
136.
137.
138.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 148.
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structural difference between the distribution of the expected trial
139
liability and the distribution of the settlement burden. Hence, there
is no opportunity for insurers to engage in cramdown settlements that
create a plaintiff-overcompensation hazard. In this way, the quota
share system seems to mark an improvement over horizontally sliced
towers. And this very lack of a cramdown dynamic among insurers
gives managers of corporations in the United States an incentive to
resist the quota share system, for reasons discussed in Part IV.
The quota share system only partly removes the cramdown
dynamic, however, because it does not eliminate the structural
conflict of interests between the insurers as a group and the
defendants sitting atop the tower. The division in the tower between
these two groups is still horizontal, as it is in American-style towers.
Therefore, duties to settle and contribute, running from the insurers
as a group to the policyholders, would still be necessary. And the
need for a duty to contribute, in turn, implies the possibility of
cramdown settlements negotiated directly between defendants and
plaintiffs.
Another drawback of the quota share system is that it apparently
requires all insurers to consent to a settlement in order to be bound
by it. The system thus may suffer from collective-action problems
such as holdouts. And a third drawback is that there is less
opportunity for insurer specialization because all insurers bear
equally the risks of different types of lawsuit. For these reasons, it is
not obvious that the quota share system marks a significant
improvement over towers that are sliced horizontally. It is
nonetheless worth noting that a segmented approach to settlements is
also compatible with the quota share system and would mitigate its
apparent collective-action problems. If each insurer in a vertically
sliced tower could settle separately with the plaintiff, holdouts would
not be able to force trial on other insurers who would rather settle.
Segmented settlements in this context mean that each insurer could
make a payment to the plaintiff in exchange for a waiver of the
plaintiff’s right to collect the percentage of the damages within the
tower covered by that insurer.

139. Id.
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IV. REFORM OBSTACLES: OLD-FASHIONED JUDGES AND PROFITSMOOTHING MANAGERS
This Article has argued that segmented settlements are superior
not only to the collective approach now in use but also to the
alternatives that other scholars have considered. But if the segmented
approach really is more efficient, why has it not been adopted
already? Two potential obstacles to reform seem most likely. The first
is judges who might think that the approach is inconsistent with
insurers’ traditional “duty to defend.” The second, and probably
more important, potential reform obstacle is corporate managers.
While collective settlements reduce shareholder profits, they serve
managerial interests by increasing the likelihood that settlement
payments will be fully covered by D&O insurance, thereby shielding
reported corporate earnings—and managers’ incentive-based pay—
from the impact of shareholder lawsuits brought in response to the
managers’ conduct. If settlements were segmented, a larger
proportion of settlements would be paid by corporations rather than
their insurers, thereby increasing the volatility of reported corporate
earnings and reducing the managers’ reputations and compensation.
There are two situations in which the collective approach is
especially likely to advance managers’ interests. Both involve the use
of the duty to contribute to overcome insurer resistance to settlement.
The first is when the plaintiff thinks that the expected damages are
significantly higher than the D&O insurers do. And the second is
when there is a good chance that a coverage exclusion would be
triggered if the case went to trial. In both situations, the duty to
contribute’s cramdown effect can help bring about a covered
settlement. And the potential for a cramdown settlement increases
with the number of policies in the tower, encouraging managers to
divide coverage among more insurers than they would otherwise.
Segmented settlements would supersede the duty to contribute and
hence eliminate this incentive to overdivide coverage.
A. Judicial Conservatism and the Duty To Defend
Considering the judicial obstacle first, some courts might
consider it an act of bad faith for a liability insurer to enter into a
settlement that does not include a full release for the policyholder.
Under the segmented approach, an insurer could settle in exchange
for a release that extends only to damages covered by the policy. The
basis for such judicial resistance would be the common law’s duty to
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defend, under which a liability insurer must represent its
policyholder’s best interests both in court and in negotiations with
140
plaintiffs. A judge who is mindful of this duty might be sympathetic
to a policyholder who complained that her insurer abandoned her by
settling out of the case, notwithstanding that the insurer obtained a
liability waiver from the plaintiff up to the policy limit.
Judicial resistance to segmented settlements would probably be
strongest in the context of traditional liability insurance such as
automobile and homeowners coverage. People buy such insurance
not only to shield their wealth but also to enlist a litigation expert
who can choose a lawyer for them and manage their defenses. This is
why automobile and homeowners policies assign both the right and
the duty to defend to the insurer, giving the policyholder the benefit
of the insurer’s expertise throughout the litigation. It is also why
many courts hold that an insurer acts in bad faith if it asks its
policyholder to contribute to a settlement unless the insurer is also
141
tendering its full policy amount.
Such a request implies a
negotiation between the insurer and policyholder over the division of
the settlement burden, a negotiation in which the asymmetry of
expertise presumably puts the policyholder at a disadvantage.
With D&O insurance, however, the relationship between insurer
and policyholder is quite different. The corporate managers covered
by D&O insurance usually have experience with litigation and are
likely to retain control over their own defenses. For this reason, most
D&O policies explicitly abrogate the insurer’s duty to defend, and
they require the policyholder to consult with the insurer before
settling so that the insurer is not left out of settlement negotiations
altogether. In this context, the policyholder has paid only for an
underwriter, and so there is no reason for courts to force the insurer
to serve as a fiduciary as well.
A second judicial concern with segmented settlements has arisen
in what might be called “sandwich” settlements, which occur when
both the primary insurer and the defendant settle but an excess
insurer remains in the case. Sandwich settlements are the only type of
segmented settlement that seems to have been attempted with any
frequency, perhaps because they include a full release for the
defendant and hence create no liability risk to the primary insurer
under the duty to defend. But some courts have blocked sandwich
140. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966).
141. See Syverud, supra note 43, at 1155–56.
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settlements on different grounds, namely that a trial involving only
the plaintiff and an excess insurer would be a “sham” because the
nominal defendant (the policyholder) no longer has any liability
142
exposure. In the 1978 case United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Lay,
the Seventh Circuit cited this concern in holding that a sandwich
settlement also extinguished the excess insurer’s liability even though
143
the excess insurer was not a party to the settlement agreement.
The Lay court’s concern about sham lawsuits is unconvincing, as
it seemingly would require that all liability policies have limits so that
policyholders always have residual exposure. Few courts would agree
that a liability policy must have a limit to be enforceable at all.
Unsurprisingly, most courts that have considered sandwich
144
settlements have rejected Lay’s reasoning.
In recent years, however, excess insurers have mounted
successful objections to sandwich settlements on purely contractual
145
grounds. This trend seems to be the result of more careful drafting,
with excess policies now specifying that coverage begins only when
the primary insurer has actually paid out its full policy amount.
Earlier policies could be interpreted to permit liability for the excess
146
insurer when the primary policy was merely “exhausted.” Since
settling is advantageous to the primary insurer only if it can do so for
less than its policy limit, this more explicit wording makes sandwich
settlements infeasible.
The fact that insurers are drafting excess policies to preclude a
particular type of segmented settlement implies that the judiciary is
not the only obstacle to reform. The buyers of corporate liability
insurance, who otherwise would penalize insurers for inserting
inefficient clauses into policies, seem not to want segmented
settlements either. When it comes to D&O insurance, the buyers are,
of course, the corporate managers who often are sued in shareholder

142. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978).
143. Id. at 423.
144. Decisions upholding such settlements include Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d
665 (2d Cir. 1928); Kelley Co. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 662 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D. Wis.
1987); Siligato v. Welch, 607 F. Supp. 743 (D. Conn. 1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Riverside Ins.
Co., 509 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Drake v. Ryan, 498 N.W.2d 29 (Minn. 1993); Loy v.
Bunderson, 320 N.W.2d 175 (Wis. 1982).
145. E.g., Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1034 (E.D. Mich.
2007); Qualcomm Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 786
(Ct. App. 2008).
146. Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666; see also Qualcomm, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 786 (collecting cases).
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lawsuits. Why would managers resist an approach to settlements that,
as is argued here, would increase corporate profits?
B. Collective Settlements as Reputation and Compensation Shields
A commonplace among corporate-law commentators is that
147
managers’ top priority in shareholder lawsuits is avoiding trial. Trial
can bring to light unflattering information about the managers’
performance, and it threatens their personal wealth because a judicial
finding of deliberate misconduct would preclude both insurance
coverage and indemnification by the corporation. Managers therefore
will prefer settling even some cases in which shareholder interests
would be better served by a trial.
Although the risks to managers from trial explain why essentially
all shareholder lawsuits that are not dismissed are settled, they do not
explain why corporate managers cause their firms to purchase as
much D&O coverage as they do. Even without insurance, managers
could pay to settle shareholder lawsuits pre-trial and then obtain
indemnification from their corporation. D&O insurance is needed to
protect managers’ personal wealth only in the rare lawsuit that is
large enough to bankrupt the corporation. This implies “catastrophic”
D&O policies with high deductibles. But D&O policies do not make
148
aggressive use of deductibles, suggesting that corporate managers
are averse not just to trial but also to pre-trial settlements that, if not
covered by insurance, would put an unsightly dent in their firm’s
reported earnings. As noted previously, the average securities classaction settlement in recent years equaled 18 percent of the average
149
quarterly earnings of Fortune 500 firms. Adding in the typical
defense costs in shareholder lawsuits raises the total costs of such
150
suits as a percentage of quarterly earnings to 23 percent. In other
words, most of the D&O coverage that corporations purchase serves
not to protect managers in case of their corporations’ bankruptcy, but
rather to reduce the volatility of their corporations’ reported
earnings. The price of this lower volatility is a reduction in the
baseline earnings level by the amount of the insurance premiums, a

147. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 407.
148. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
150. As noted previously, defense costs typically equal about 30 percent of the settlement
amount. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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price that the managers who make the D&O purchase decisions are
evidently willing to accept.
At first blush it might seem that risk-averse shareholders would
benefit from the reduction in earnings volatility that D&O insurance
provides. But this perception is inaccurate as applied to shareholders
of publicly traded corporations, who can hedge firm-specific risk in
the same way that an insurer does, namely by holding a diversified
151
investment portfolio. In other words, the volatility of returns on a
diversified stock portfolio is not lower when the firms in the portfolio
own D&O insurance, a point that becomes especially clear once one
recognizes that the D&O insurers will also likely be represented in
the portfolio. But the overall returns on the portfolio will be lower
due to the administrative costs of buying and selling the policies and
running the insurance companies. A rough estimate of these costs
suggests that they equal at least 20 percent of total insurance
152
premiums.
While D&O insurance will not reduce the volatility of the
153
returns on a diversified stock portfolio, it will reduce the earnings
volatility of those individual firms whose managers are sued. It does
this by replacing large but infrequent settlement payments with
smaller but regular premium payments. In other words, D&O
insurance protects earnings reports from the dip that a large
settlement payment would otherwise cause. And managers benefit
from litigation-proof earnings reports because investors use such
reports to evaluate the managers’ performance, and because most
managerial compensation is tied to the firm’s stock price and reported

151. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 58.
152. The insurance industry uses the term “loading costs” to describe those expenses that
are added to the insurer’s actual expected liability on an insurance policy to calculate the
premium charged. Loading costs are usually between 20 and 30 percent of the total premium
amount. Id. A portion of these costs include the necessary returns on investment for the
insurer’s shareholders, and thus are not a true cost from the perspective of diversified
shareholders. On the other hand, loading costs exclude the administrative expenses incurred by
the insurance buyers, which are a true cost to diversified investors.
153. Even diversified shareholders might benefit from D&O insurance to the extent that it
reduces the likelihood that portfolio firms will incur costs of financial distress such as
bankruptcy. But, again, this concern would justify “catastrophic” coverage rather than the
policies with lower deductibles that we actually observe. Professors Baker and Griffith have
considered other potential benefits to diversified shareholders of D&O insurance, such as tax
savings, but they have concluded that none of these are convincing either. Id. at 63–68.
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154

financial results. Although the D&O premiums themselves also
reduce reported profits, their impact is both smaller and more
predictable, and they may not affect managers’ compensation at all if
they are priced into the baseline stock price or profit level used for
155
issuing stock options or calculating earnings-based bonuses.
This discussion suggests that corporate managers actually have
two important objectives in shareholder lawsuits: they want all suits
that survive the motion to dismiss to be settled before trial, and they
want the cost of the settlements to be covered entirely by insurers.
The managers have a great deal of control over the first objective, as
they can always choose to settle a case pre-trial and arrange for their
corporation to pay for it. They have less control over the second
objective, which requires the cooperation of the D&O insurers. And
the insurers may resist paying for a settlement even when they are not
structurally biased against settling by the collective settlement
approach. There are two situations in which this type of insurer
resistance to settlement is particularly likely. The first is when the
plaintiff honestly thinks that his case is worth more than the D&O
insurers do. And the second is when there is a good chance that trial
would result in a finding of deliberate misconduct, triggering a
coverage exclusion. To force insured settlements in such cases,
managers have an incentive to structure their insurance coverage to
maximize the likelihood of a cramdown settlement under the duty to
contribute. In this way, managers’ interest in shielding earnings
reports from volatility caused by shareholder litigation gives them a
reason not only to preserve the current regime of collective
settlements, but also to divide their D&O coverage among more
insurers than they would otherwise.
1. Insurer Resistance Due to Plaintiff or Insurer Overconfidence.
When negotiating to settle a shareholder lawsuit, the most important
factor that parties consider is the damages that would be awarded if
the case went to trial. After conducting extensive interviews with
154. Rose & Squire, supra note 105, at 1693 (describing how corporate liability for
managerial misconduct can provide useful information to diversified shareholders even if
damages payments constitute mere pocket-shifting).
155. See Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands and
Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. L. REV. 347, 364 (2008) (describing a typical bonus plan using earnings
per share as the baseline); Michael T. Higgins, A Better Approach to the Bonus Question, BUS.
WK. ONLINE (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/nov2003/
sb2003115_9919.htm (explaining that earnings-based performance bonuses are awarded only for
performance in excess of a baseline).
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individuals who are regularly involved in shareholder litigation—
including defense-side and plaintiff-side lawyers, insurance
underwriters, insurance claims managers, and corporate managers
who purchase D&O insurance—Professors Baker and Griffith wrote:
156
“Damages, our respondents insisted, drive settlements.”
This
description of settlement behavior in the D&O context accords with
the standard economic model of litigation settlements, under which
litigants’ willingness to settle is based on their estimates of the
157
benefits and costs of trial.
In the hypotheticals this Article has used to illustrate settlement
dynamics, the plaintiff and the defense-side parties share a common
estimate of the expected damages. But of course such estimates can
differ, and they can do so in ways that make settlement more or less
likely. For example, if a liability insurer thinks that the plaintiff’s case
is worth more than the plaintiff does, then an insurer-covered
settlement is especially likely, for the same reason that a sale is more
likely if the prospective buyer values the sales item more than the
seller does. But if the plaintiff thinks his case is worth more than the
insurers do, then the parties will be less likely to agree on a settlement
price.
Even, however, when a plaintiff’s estimate of the expected
damages is greater than that of the defense-side parties, the parties’
common interest in avoiding trial expenses might enable them to
reach a settlement. The trial expenses that settlement avoids can be
seen as a “surplus” that the parties divide between themselves in the
158
settlement agreement. If this surplus is big enough, it can bridge a
gap between the parties’ damages estimates that would otherwise
preclude settlement. As a simple illustration, imagine a lawsuit in
which the plaintiff thinks that the expected damages are $1.5M, but
the defendant thinks they are only $1M. This difference in the
damages estimates opens up a $0.5M gap between the plaintiff’s
minimum settlement demand and the defendant’s maximum
settlement offer. But imagine further that the trial would cost each
party $0.3M in litigation expenses. Now the defendant would be
willing to offer up to $1.3M to avoid trial, while the plaintiff will be
156. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 161.
157. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 764–65 (noting that trial rather than settlement occurs
when the plaintiff’s estimate of expected damages minus the defendant’s exceeds total trial
costs).
158. Another motive to settle is risk-aversion, which can cause a party to favor the certainty
of a settlement payment to the uncertainty of a trial.
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willing to accept as little as $1.2M. The desire to avoid trial expenses
has created a range of values—between $1.2M and $1.3M—in which
159
Put in general terms, and
settlement is mutually beneficial.
assuming that the parties are risk-neutral, a settlement will occur so
long as the total expected trial expenses are greater than the
160
plaintiff’s expected damages estimate minus the defendant’s. On the
other hand, if the gap in estimates is greater than the surplus
attributable to the avoidance of trial expenses, then negotiations will
break down.
The likelihood that the parties will differ in their estimates of the
expected damages is particularly high in the context of shareholder
litigation. Very few shareholder lawsuits actually go to trial, and so
litigants must rely on indirect predictors of hypothetical damages
awards such as investor losses and intangible factors such as how
161
scandalous the managers’ behavior seems. Parties will naturally vary
in their estimates of the magnitude and relevance of these factors,
creating a high probability of honest differences in their appraisals of
the lawsuit’s value. Although risk-aversion and avoided trial expenses
may sometimes bridge these differences, the likelihood of a
negotiations breakdown nonetheless seems particularly high in the
shareholder litigation context.
One of the most important implications of the duty to contribute
is that it creates an additional form of surplus for the parties to a
settlement agreement. That surplus is the value transfer that a
cramdown settlement captures from the lower-level insurers in the
insurance tower. And the addition of this further advantage of
settling may be enough to bring the parties to an agreement in cases
in which risk-aversion and avoided trial expenses are not alone
sufficient to bridge a gap in damages estimates. Put another way, the
wealth transfer captured by the duty to contribute raises the
maximum settlement amount that is acceptable to the upper-level
insurers in the tower, increasing the likelihood that this amount
equals or exceeds the minimum amount the plaintiff is willing to
accept. Therefore, corporate managers who want to reduce the risk
that D&O insurers will refuse to meet a plaintiff’s settlement demand
will subdivide coverage among multiple insurers to increase the
likelihood that the duty to contribute is implicated.
159. The range may be wider if the parties are risk-averse.
160. See infra Appendix.
161. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 156–66.
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As an illustration, consider a shareholder lawsuit against a
162
corporate manager protected by a single, $5M D&O policy. Assume
that the parties agree that the potential damages are $5M but disagree
about the plaintiff’s chances of winning at trial: the plaintiff thinks he
has an 80 percent chance of winning, making his estimate of the
expected damages $4M, while the insurer thinks the plaintiff has only
a 50 percent chance, making its estimate of the expected damages
$2.5M. Assume further that trial expenses would be $0.5M on each
side. On these assumptions, the plaintiff would rationally be willing to
settle for as little as $3.5M. The insurer, in turn, would be willing to
settle for up to $2.75. This figure represents the insurer’s estimate of
the expected damages plus half the defense’s trial costs, since on these
assumptions the insurer would bear trial costs only if the plaintiff
163
loses. Thus, even with trial costs factored in, a $0.75M gap between
the plaintiff’s minimum demand and the insurer’s maximum offer
remains. This gap means that the manager will be able to avoid trial
only by agreeing to a settlement that is paid by herself or her
164
corporation rather than the insurer.
Now consider what would happen in the same hypothetical if the
manager, instead of buying just one $5M policy, divided her coverage
between a $2M primary policy and a $3M excess policy. In this case,
the insurers’ estimate of the expected liability distribution is given by
Table 2: the primary insurer believes it faces $1M in expected trial
liability (plus $0.5M in defense costs if the defendant prevails), and
the excess insurer believes it faces expected trial liability of $1.5M.
Therefore, to avoid trial, the excess insurer will be willing to settle the
case for up to $3.5M so long as it can use the duty to contribute to
force the primary insurer to tender its policy amount of $2M.
Because, as noted in the previous paragraph, the plaintiff is willing to
settle for $3.5M, the possibility now exists of a pre-trial settlement
paid by the insurers notwithstanding that they believe the plaintiff’s
162. A version of this hypothetical lawsuit using more generalized terms is provided in the
Appendix.
163. Because the potential damages equal the policy limit, the insurer will disregard the
defense’s expected trial expenses to the extent it expects the plaintiff to prevail, as these
expenses will then be borne by the manager or her corporation. This insurer bears the defense’s
trial expenses only if the verdict is for the defendant.
164. After settling the manager might try to seek reimbursement from the insurer under an
aggressive version of the duty to contribute, which she would argue is applicable here even
though the settlement demand was within the insurer’s policy limit. Except, however, when they
are applying California law, courts appear to be disinclined to permit such claims. See infra
notes 184–190 and accompanying text.
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suit is worth significantly less than the plaintiff does. In other words,
the $1M value transfer produced by the duty to contribute has
increased the plaintiff’s and excess insurer’s mutual gains from
settling by an amount large enough to bridge the difference in their
estimates of the expected damages.
A possible reaction to this hypothetical is that the duty to
contribute seems to be providing a social benefit: by bridging a gap in
expected damages estimates, the duty is making possible a settlement
that avoids the expenses of trial. But it must be remembered that, at
least in the context of shareholder litigation, the most likely
consequence of a breakdown in negotiations between the liability
insurers and the plaintiff is not a trial; it is instead a settlement that is
paid by the defendant corporation instead of the insurers. Thus, there
is little reason to think that the duty to contribute is actually avoiding
trial expenses in most shareholder lawsuits. In addition, the duty to
contribute widens the range of potential settlement amounts in an
asymmetrical way: it increases the amount that upper-level insurers
are willing to pay rather than lowering the amount that plaintiffs are
willing to accept. Thus, when the duty to contribute bridges a
difference in the parties’ estimates of the expected damages, it always
does so by moving the settlement amount toward the plaintiff’s
(higher) rather than the insurers’ (lower) estimate, regardless of
which of them is mistaken about the lawsuit’s real value. Unless
plaintiffs are never the mistaken ones, the necessary conclusion is that
the duty to contribute biases settlement negotiations toward plaintiff
overcompensation, thereby generating social costs such as too many
lawsuits and pricier liability insurance. For these reasons, it would be
a mistake to conclude that the duty to contribute, by bridging gaps
between parties’ estimates of expected damages in shareholder
lawsuits, is increasing social wealth rather than destroying it.
2. Insurer Resistance Due to Coverage Exclusions. The second
scenario in which liability insurers are especially likely to resist a pretrial settlement is when there is a good chance that trial would result
in a finding of deliberate defendant misconduct that forfeits
165
coverage. Thus, Professors Baker and Griffith have found that when

165. See, e.g., CHUBB GRP. OF INS. COS., CHUBB FOREFRONT PORTFOLIO 3.0: DIRECTORS
& OFFICERS AND ENTITY LIABILITY § V(A)(9)(a) (2011), available at http://www.chubb.com/
businesses/csi/chubb13760.pdf (disclaiming liability for “any deliberately fraudulent act or
omission, or any willful violation of any statute or regulation, by an Insured”).
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D&O insurers have a strong coverage defense—the most important
type being the exclusion for deliberate fraud—they use it in
settlement negotiations to reduce their liability and increase the
166
portion of the settlement paid by the corporate defendant.
Similarly, Professors Michael Klausner and Jason Hegland have
found that the percentage of settlement amounts paid by insurers
rather than defendants is lower in securities actions in which a
167
coverage exclusion is more likely.
Just as it can overcome the obstacle to settlement caused by
differences in damages estimates, the value transfer produced by the
duty to contribute can overcome insurer settlement resistance due to
coverage defenses. For this reason, the risk of a coverage exclusion
creates an additional motive for managers to increase the likelihood
of a cramdown settlement by subdividing D&O coverage among
multiple insurers.
Consider again the example of a corporate manager who is
covered by a $5M D&O policy and who faces a shareholder lawsuit
that she and her insurer estimate has potential damages of $5M and a
50 percent probability of a verdict for the plaintiff. To isolate the
effect of coverage exclusions, assume for now that the plaintiff agrees
with these estimates. Assume further that the D&O policy contains
an exclusion for deliberate misconduct. Finally, assume all parties
agree that, if the plaintiff wins at trial, there is a further 50 percent
chance that the verdict will include a finding that triggers the
exclusion. Trial thus presents three possible outcomes: a verdict for
the defendant (50 percent chance), a damages award that is covered
by insurance (25 percent), and a damages award that is not covered
168
(25 percent).

166. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 197.
167. Klausner & Hegland, supra note 9, at 2.
168. Again, a version of this hypothetical lawsuit using more generalized terms is provided
in the Appendix.
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Table 3.Liability with Coverage Exclusion and a Single Insurer
Expected
Share of
Benefit (Cost)
Trial Liability Collective
of Collective
Settlement
Settlement
Insurer,
$1.25M
$2.5M
($1.25M)
$5M limit
Defendant

$1.25M

—

$1.25M

Total

$2.5M

$2.5M

—

The lawsuit’s fair settlement value is $2.5M, well within the $5M
policy limit. But because of the policy exclusion, the insurer’s
expected trial liability (disregarding litigation expenses) is only
169
$1.25M. Unless the plaintiff is willing to settle at a deep discount,
perhaps due to risk aversion or high expected trial costs, he will not
make a settlement demand that the insurer will accept. Thus, to
achieve a pre-trial settlement, the manager will have to pay the
170
plaintiff with her corporation’s money rather than the insurer’s.
Now consider what would happen in this same case if instead of
being covered by a single $5M policy, the manager divided coverage
between a $2M primary policy and a $3M excess policy, both of which
171
contained exclusions for deliberate misconduct.

169. The insurer’s expected liability of $1.25M = $5M (the potential damages) x 50% (the
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x 50% (the probability that a verdict for the plaintiff
does not trigger the exclusion).
170. Moreover, the manager may not be able to wield the duty to settle to force the insurer
to pay the actuarially fair amount, as courts have held that this duty does not create liability for
damages that would otherwise be uninsurable as a matter of public policy, such as those
resulting from intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975
P.2d 652, 658 (Cal. 1999) (enforcing a “policy of not allowing liability for intentional
wrongdoing to be offset or reduced by the negligence of another,” including an insurer’s
negligent failure to settle).
171. Alternatively she could have three or more policies providing $5M in total coverage, a
variation that would not change the conclusions reached here.
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Table 4. Liability with Exclusions and a Tower
Expected
Share of
Trial Liability Collective
Settlement
Primary Insurer,
$0.5M
$2.0M
$2M policy
Excess Insurer,
$0.75M
$0.5M
$3M policy

59

Benefit (Cost)
of Collective
Settlement

($1.5M)
$0.25M

Defendant

$1.25M

—

$1.25M

Total

$2.5M

$2.5M

—

In this case the duty to contribute comes to the manager’s rescue.
Note that the primary insurer is deeply reluctant to settle pre-trial: its
share of an actuarially fair settlement is $2M (i.e., its policy limit),
172
while its expected trial liability is only $0.5M. Yet the excess insurer
is willing to settle for the actuarially fair $2.5M assuming it can use
the duty to contribute to transfer $2M of that cost to the primary
insurer. That transfer leaves the excess insurer with net liability of
173
$0.5M, as compared with its expected trial liability of $0.75M. As in
the case of differing damages estimates, the duty to contribute has
made an insured pre-trial settlement possible even though the
plaintiff perceives that he has significantly more to gain from trial
than the insurers collectively think they have to lose.
In combination with the discussion of the duty to contribute in
Part II.A, this analysis indicates that the duty distorts settlements in
two ways: it increases the likelihood that plaintiffs will be
overcompensated, and it increases the likelihood of an insurercovered settlement in cases in which insurance seemingly should be
unavailable because there is a good chance that the defendant
engaged in deliberate wrongdoing. These distortions will trade off
against each other. For example, considering again the hypothetical
lawsuit summarized in Table 4, the largest settlement in which the

172. $0.5M = $2M (the primary policy limit) x 50% (the probability of a verdict for the
plaintiff) x 50% (the probability that a verdict for the plaintiff does not trigger the exclusion).
173. $0.75M = $3M (the portion of a $5M verdict that falls within the excess policy) x 50%
(the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff) x 50% (the probability that a verdict for the
plaintiff does not trigger the exclusion).
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excess insurer would reasonably participate is $2.75M, only $0.25M
higher than the fair settlement amount of $2.5M. By contrast, the
otherwise identical lawsuit summarized in Table 2 presented a
potential of up to $1M in plaintiff overcompensation. In general, the
duty to contribute is more likely to result in plaintiff
overcompensation when the probability of a coverage exclusion is
low, and more likely to result in coverage of an otherwise uninsurable
loss when the probability of an exclusion is high.
To be sure, the duty to contribute’s cramdown effect will not be
sufficient to overcome an insurer’s reluctance to settle in all cases. A
primary insurer might not be overborne if, for example, both of the
aforementioned sources of settlement resistance were present in the
same case. Consider what would happen in the lawsuit summarized in
Table 4 if the plaintiff thought that his probability of winning at trial
were 80 percent while the insurers continued to place that probability
at 50 percent. Now the plaintiff’s estimate of the expected damages is
$4M, well above the $2.75M figure that Table 4 indicates is the largest
settlement demand the excess insurer, putting aside trial expenses,
would be willing to accept. To avoid trial in that case, the managerdefendant will have to use the corporation’s money to pay the
difference. Concordantly, Professors Baker and Griffith observe that
defendant corporations sometimes contribute to shareholder
litigation settlements even when the total settlement amount is within
175
the limits of the available insurance.
But the amount the
corporation must pay—and hence the negative impact on reported
earnings—still is likely to be smaller than it would be without the duty
to contribute. Note in Table 4 that the insurers in combination will
pay a maximum of $2.75M toward a settlement if we assume that the
primary insurer can be forced to tender its policy amount, as
contrasted with the maximum of $1.25M they would pay if each could
settle separately for its expected trial liability.
3. Segmentation’s Impact on Towers and Profit Reports. The
foregoing discussion suggests that one of the primary benefits to
corporate managers of insurance towers is the smoothing of reported
corporate earnings. But towers provide this benefit only because

174. As Table 4 reflects, the excess insurer’s expected trial liability is $0.75M. Therefore,
assuming it can obtain a $2M contribution from the primary insurer, the largest settlement in
which the excess insurer would participate is $2.75M.
175. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 143.
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settlements are collective. If defense-side parties could settle
separately, lower-level insurers would no longer be structurally
undermotivated to settle, thereby eliminating the rationale for the
duty to contribute. And without that duty, there would be no
cramdown mechanism to force lower-level insurers to settle for more
than their own estimates of their expected trial liability. It follows
that, if settlements were segmented, managers would often have to
rely more on their corporation’s checkbook and less on insurance to
176
pay for settlements of shareholder lawsuits.
A potential concern here is that increased indemnification would
not in fact be available, and thus that segmented settlements would
cause managers to bear significantly more personal liability. Except,
however, for cases in which the corporation goes bankrupt, this would
not be likely. Thus, in most securities class actions, indemnification by
the corporation is readily available: such actions are typically brought
directly against corporate managers, and state incorporation statutes
permit indemnification for amounts paid to settle direct suits against
corporate agents so long as there is no judicial finding that the agents
177
acted in bad faith or in knowing violation of law. In derivative suits,
on the other hand, corporations are statutorily barred from
indemnifying managers for damages awards or settlement
178
payments. Even in derivative cases, however, there is reason to
doubt that segmented settlements would present managers with a
significant risk of personal liability. Essentially all public corporations
have charter provisions that immunize managers from personal

176. If the segmented approach were adopted, a question that would arise is how the
settlement burden would be divided in cases in which a policy exclusion is likely. For example,
in the case summarized in Table 4, the primary insurer would be willing to offer only $0.5M to
settle its $2M liability segment. Even if the plaintiff agreed that the probability of a guilty
verdict were only 50 percent, the plaintiff would place an expected value on this slice of the
liability range of $1M, creating a potentially insurmountable negotiation gap. The solution
would be for the settlement between the primary insurer and the plaintiff to include a
stipulation that the plaintiff’s waiver of his right to collect the first $2M of any subsequent
damages award is subject to the condition that the verdict not include a finding that would have
triggered an exclusion. Such a condition on the waiver would close the valuation gap and make
the separate settlement possible. In this way, segmentation would acquire a new dimension, with
the potential liability range containing not just a series of horizontal slices based on policy limits,
but also a vertical slice based on the probability of a policy exclusion. The vertical slice of the
tower representing the expected value of the uninsurable damages would be the settlement
responsibility of the defendant rather than the insurers.
177. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2012).
178. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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179

liability for violating the duty of care. Most derivative suits thus
settle for injunctive relief, such as corporate-governance changes,
180
rather than monetary damages. To be sure, these settlements also
181
typically include an award of the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. Unlike
amounts paid in settlement, however, the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees
can be reimbursed in derivative suits by the corporation as long as a
judge finds that the lawsuit conferred a “substantial benefit” on the
182
corporation and its shareholders. Therefore, if a D&O insurer were
unwilling to settle pre-trial in a derivative suit because it thought that
the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees were excessive, the manager-defendants
could cause the corporation to pay to settle that insurer’s share of the
liability burden.
These observations suggest that the most likely consequence of
segmented settlements is not more personal liability for managers.
Nor, importantly, is it more litigation or trials. To the contrary,
segmented settlements would eliminate the need for follow-on
litigation to enforce the duties to settle and contribute. Instead, the
primary consequence of segmented settlements would be an increase
in the proportion of settlement money paid by corporations rather
than by their insurers. And this result, perhaps counterintuitively, is
one that corporate shareholders should welcome. A decrease in the
proportion of shareholder lawsuit settlements paid by D&O insurers
would cause premiums to fall, and so this aspect of the change should
be essentially a wash in terms of corporate profits. But D&O
insurance premiums would fall an additional amount to reflect the
social benefits of segmented settlements noted previously: less
plaintiff overcompensation, less spending on defense lawyers, and
greater insurer specialization. And these reductions in costs would
represent a gain to shareholders.
In addition to generating this direct increase in overall corporate
profits, segmented settlements would have an important corporategovernance benefit: they would reduce managers’ ability to use D&O
insurance to insulate corporate earnings reports from the impact of
shareholder lawsuits. By displacing liability costs onto insurers,

179. See, e.g., DEL. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
180. Erickson, supra note 48, at 1749.
181. Steven D. Frankel, Note, The Oracle Cases Settlement: Too Charitable to Ellison and
the Plaintiffs’ Attorneys?, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 625, 629 (2006) (pointing out that the
“vast majority” of derivative action settlements include an award of attorneys’ fees).
182. E.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (Ct. App. 1968).
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insurance weakens the link between each corporation’s reported
earnings and the contribution of that firm’s managers to diversified
shareholder wealth. Thus, if the managers of a particular corporation
generate a disproportionate amount of shareholder litigation—the
costs of which, as noted, shareholders themselves ultimately bear—
this fact is unlikely to be evident from the corporation’s reported
earnings, as the litigation costs are shifted to the firm’s D&O
183
insurers.
For this reason, segmented settlements would make each
corporation’s reported financial results a more accurate measure of
the costs to shareholders of litigation resulting from the conduct of
that corporation’s managers. Segmented settlements therefore would
help diversified shareholders better monitor—and, through earningsbased compensation, better motivate—the managers of their portfolio
firms.
A related benefit of segmented settlements would be the
rationalization of insurance towers. Segmenting settlements probably
would not cause insurance towers to disappear altogether, as dividing
coverage among insurers would still serve the valuable function of
limiting each corporation’s exposure to the risk that a particular
insurer will fail. But with the duty to contribute discarded as
unnecessary, managers would no longer face an incentive to subdivide
coverage further in order to encourage cramdown settlements.
Instead, their incentive would be to divide coverage among insurers
only to the extent that doing so is efficient.
C. Reform’s First Step: Reversing the Bias of the Duty To Contribute
This Article has argued that social welfare generally, and
shareholder wealth specifically, would be enhanced if settlements of
shareholder lawsuits were segmented rather than collective. If this

183. In theory, insurers could raise the premiums they charge a corporation with a history of
submitting large insurance claims. However, as Professors Baker and Griffith describe, the
connection between premiums and firm-specific risk is imperfect, and D&O insurance pricing
has a cyclical nature that may tend to blur distinctions among buyers. BAKER & GRIFFITH,
supra note 1, at 97–101. In addition, the increase in the corporation’s earnings volatility
attributable to the rise in the premium would be much smaller than the volatility increase that
would occur if the corporation had to pay for its shareholder-lawsuit settlements entirely by
itself. And a volatility increase is what is most useful for corporate-governance purposes
because it will call more investor attention to the managers’ performance and be more likely to
reduce managerial payouts under earnings-linked compensation plans.
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argument is correct, the practical question becomes, how can the
segmented approach be realized?
The prospects for reform are clouded by the fact that the current
system for settling shareholder lawsuits reflects a state of equilibrium
under which several politically important groups appear to benefit.
Corporate managers benefit because collective settlements
camouflage the costs to shareholders of lawsuits brought in response
to the managers’ behavior. Plaintiffs’ attorneys benefit from the
larger settlements produced by the duty to contribute. And defense
attorneys benefit from the increased spending that results from the
coupling of defense coverage with liability coverage. Although larger
settlements and attorneys’ bills are paid as an initial matter by D&O
insurers, the insurers can adjust to these higher costs by charging
higher premiums. Thus, the costs of the system are ultimately borne
not by the insurers but rather by public-company shareholders and,
more broadly, by society as an implicit tax on capital formation. In
other words, the costs of the current system are dispersed, while the
benefits are concentrated in groups that are likely to be well
organized and politically influential.
The most direct way to reduce the costs of collective settlements
in shareholder lawsuits would simply be to prohibit public companies
from buying D&O insurance, except perhaps in the form of highdeductible policies whose sole purpose is to keep companies out of
bankruptcy. This change would not cause managers themselves to
bear substantially more personal liability, as they could still be
indemnified by their corporate employers. But the costs of
shareholder litigation caused by the managers’ conduct would no
longer be camouflaged, as these costs would have a direct impact on
the corporate earnings reports that form the basis of the managers’
evaluations and compensation. As a practical matter, however, such
reform seems unlikely: D&O insurance is directly authorized by
general incorporation statutes, and state legislatures would likely find
it politically difficult to enact amendments that almost certainly would
be opposed by corporate executives, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defense
attorneys alike.
A more promising avenue for reform may be through the courts.
Judges probably cannot prohibit collective settlements outright, at
least without disregarding language in commercial-liability policies
that, as indicated in Part IV.A, seem to preclude a segmented
approach. But judges could reinterpret the duty to contribute in a way
that would make the current settlement regime less attractive to
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managers. Judicial opinions on that duty have paid little attention to
the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard created by the duty’s
cramdown mechanism, implying that many courts are unaware that
the hazard exists.
A clear illustration of the judicial failure to police the plaintiffovercompensation hazard is the Second Circuit’s 2008 decision in
184
Schwartz v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. The decision involved a
securities class action against a corporate CEO who was protected by
a multi-level insurance tower that provided $50 million in total
185
coverage. The CEO was particularly anxious for the case to settle
because his corporation was bankrupt and hence indemnification was
186
unlikely. The insurers and plaintiffs were, however, unable to reach
a settlement agreement before trial. On the day before he was to
testify, the CEO accepted the plaintiffs’ settlement demand of $20
187
million, which he paid with a personal check. He then sought to
recover this amount plus interest by suing the bottom four insurers in
188
the tower for bad-faith failure to settle. In an opinion affirming a
jury verdict for the CEO, the Second Circuit treated the case as no
different from those that implicate the traditional duty to settle. The
court cited duty-to-settle cases from California, whose law governed
the action, describing how policy limits can make insurers
189
undermotivated to settle relative to their policyholders. No mention
was made of the countervailing hazard, which is not implicated in the
standard duty-to-settle case: the overeagerness of upper-level insurers
and policyholders to settle, which can cause them to favor settling
even when the plaintiff’s settlement demand exceeds the expected
damages.
Schwartz depicts the duty to contribute’s plaintiffovercompensation hazard in its most extreme form. By permitting a
policyholder to negotiate a within-limit settlement and then send the
entire bill to his insurers, the court sanctioned a settlement agreement
in which the conflict of interests was at its zenith because the
policyholder was negotiating entirely with the insurers’ money. In
such a situation, the policyholder has no incentive to reject even a

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 142.
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settlement demand that greatly exceeds the expected damages—
which may well have been true of the $20 million figure in the case—
so long as the demand does not exceed the total coverage provided by
the insurance tower. If Schwartz were widely followed, it almost
certainly would destroy the market for D&O insurance, as every
securities action that survived the motion to dismiss would
immediately be settled by the defendants, presumably for the full
amount of the available insurance. The resulting increase in
premiums would make policies unmarketable.
Fortunately, not all courts have completely neglected the conflict
of interests inherent in the duty to contribute. For example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has held that one defense-side party cannot
force others to pay for a settlement that falls entirely outside the
190
party’s segment of the liability range. In other words, in New Jersey
the duty to contribute can be invoked only by a party who will bear a
portion of the settlement burden itself. This sensible rule avoids the
extreme form of the plaintiff-overcompensation hazard that arises
when a defense-side party is able to negotiate entirely with funds that
others will be forced to provide. But it does not eliminate the hazard
altogether: as the hypothetical lawsuits summarized in Tables 2
through 4 illustrate, the duty to contribute creates an
overcompensation hazard even when, unlike in Schwartz, the total
settlement amount reaches the liability segment of the defense-side
party that negotiated the settlement.
Cases like Schwartz illustrate how courts seem to apply a
presumption in favor of cramdown settlements, apparently reasoning
that the willingness of an excess insurer or defendant to settle is prima
facie evidence of the settlement’s fairness. This Article has shown
that such reasoning is flawed. The presumption needs to be reversed:
courts should recognize that duty-to-contribute claims present a
plaintiff-overcompensation hazard that more traditional duty-tosettle claims do not, and therefore that the former needs closer rather
than laxer judicial review. If duty-to-contribute claims were harder to
win, corporate managers would derive fewer private benefits from the
collective approach to settlements, and they therefore would be less
likely to resist the more efficient settlement approach described here.
The most logical judge-made reform would be for courts simply
to refuse to enforce the duty to contribute in cases in which the

190. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 367 A.2d 864, 870 (N.J. 1976).
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defendants rather than the insurers run the defense. As was described
in Part I.C, the justification for applying any type of settlementrelated duty on insurers is to protect defendants against an abovelimit damages award when the insurers could have reduced or
eliminated the defendants’ liability by negotiating a pre-trial
settlement. This justification necessarily presupposes that the
defendants rely on the insurers to negotiate a settlement of the
defendants’ own potential liability. But this presupposition is false
when the defendants are sophisticated enough to be active in the
negotiations and hence could negotiate a separate settlement that
protects them from the risk of an above-limit award, regardless of
whether their insurers remain in the case. In that situation, the duty to
contribute serves no socially valuable purpose. The same logic also
applies, incidentally, to the duty to settle, which similarly is difficult to
justify in cases in which the defendants are running the defense and
hence could protect themselves by settling separately. But the
enforcement of that duty is less problematic given the duty’s selfregulating nature.
A possible objection to a judicial policy of refusing to enforce the
duty to contribute when the defendants run the defense is that the
duty arguably has a contractual basis, namely the standard clause in
liability policies providing that the insurer’s consent to settlement will
191
not be “unreasonably withheld.” But with respect to D&O policies
in particular, courts could plausibly interpret such clauses to mean
only that the insurer will not unreasonably refuse to settle its own
segment of the damages range in cases in which the defendant has
already settled out of the case. Given that an ongoing shareholder
lawsuit can distract managers from their main job of running the
corporation, shareholders would want D&O insurers to be under a
minimum obligation to make good-faith efforts to settle even if
settlements were segmented.
In evaluating the prospects for reform, a final question is
whether a judicial reinterpretation of the duty to contribute would
have much of a practical impact given that D&O insurers face an
incentive to compete for business by cultivating reputations for
paying out on claims. As might be expected, corporate managers
report that a D&O insurer’s “claim-paying reputation” is an
important selection criterion (albeit less important than the insurer’s
191. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting a common policy form) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
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192

financial strength and prices). But at the same time, the insurers
face a countervailing incentive to assume tough negotiating postures
as a way of discouraging plaintiffs from suing the corporations and
managers that they insure. In addition, Professors Baker and Griffith
found that D&O insurers, despite their incentive to be attractive to
corporate managers, sometimes threaten to refuse to settle as a way
193
to induce corporations to contribute more to pre-trial settlements.
Insurers are particularly likely to push for a policyholder contribution
when there is a strong possibility of a finding of deliberate misconduct
194
at trial. This approach to negotiations presumably protects insurers
from an adverse-selection problem: an insurer that became known for
paying out even in clear cases of fraud would be most attractive to
managers with the highest expectations of being sued. When
settlements are collective, however, the duty to contribute constrains
the ability of insurers to resist pre-trial settlement even in cases of
deliberate misconduct. Segmented settlements would give insurers—
and especially primary insurers—more negotiating leverage, thereby
shifting settlement liability onto the books of corporate defendants.
And given that the likelihood of a coverage exclusion is positively
correlated with the merits of the lawsuit, a decrease in net insurance
coverage in such cases would raise the informational value to
shareholders of corporate earnings reports and hence advance the
deterrence goals that shareholder lawsuits are supposed to serve.
CONCLUSION
The current system for settling lawsuits against insured
defendants rests on an assumption so widely accepted that it goes
unnoticed. The assumption is that any lawsuit settlement will be a
single agreement that collectively binds the defendant and all of its
liability insurers. The unchallenged nature of this assumption is
surprising in light of the costly conflict of interests it produces. The
conflict stems from the fact that liability policies typically assign each
insurer and the policyholder a different segment of the range of
potential damages in a lawsuit. This combination of collective
settlements and segmented liability means that, when a case settles
pre-trial for the expected damages, some defense-side parties pay
more, and others pay less, than their expected trial liability. Several
192. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 42, at 26 fig.46.
193. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 1, at 197.
194. Id. at 197.

SQUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS

9/17/2012 12:50 PM

69

legal devices have been developed to correct the disincentive to settle
that the collective approach creates for lower-level insurers. But
because these devices all preserve the collective approach, they
introduce their own costly distortions.
Among the most important of these distortions is a systematic
plaintiff-overcompensation hazard that arises when an excess insurer
or defendant is able to force the primary insurer, and any subsituated
excess insurers, to contribute their policy amounts in support of a
settlement that the excess insurer or defendant has negotiated with
the plaintiff. Like the collective nature of settlements, this “duty to
contribute” has gone unnoticed by commentators. Besides
encouraging settlements that overcompensate plaintiffs, the duty to
contribute interferes with insurer specialization and generates other
costs that will drive up liability insurance premiums.
If defense-side parties could settle separately their respective
segments of the damages range, the separation between settlement
liability and trial liability would collapse. In this way, segmented
settlements would eliminate the conflict of interests that courts and
commentators now treat as an unavoidable byproduct of policy limits.
Courts could thus dispense with the duty to contribute and the more
widely discussed duty to settle, both of which are designed to
overcome the structural disincentive of insurers to settle when the
potential damages exceed the insurers’ policy limits and settlements
are collective.
The fact that segmented settlements are not already used in
shareholder lawsuits is difficult to attribute to judicial conservatism
alone. Principal-agent conflict between shareholders and corporate
managers must also bear some blame. Segmented settlements would
increase shareholder profits by reducing or eliminating distortions
that drive up D&O insurance premiums. But the current system
advances managers’ interests by insulating their reputations and
performance-based pay from the higher earnings volatility that would
occur if the impact of shareholder lawsuit settlements were not
deflected onto insurers.
The private benefits to corporate managers of collective
settlements also help explain why public companies purchase tiered
D&O coverage from multiple insurers. Insurance towers increase the
likelihood that a plaintiff’s settlement offer will trigger the duty to
contribute, enabling defense-side parties on upper floors to impose a
collective settlement that lower-floor insurers resist. This cramdown
mechanism can produce an insured settlement even when the insurers
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collectively believe that the plaintiff is overestimating the expected
damages or when there is a strong chance that trial would result in a
finding of deliberate defendant misconduct that exempts coverage.
By dividing coverage among multiple insurers, managers can pit
insurers against each other in a way that makes an insured settlement
more likely, thereby camouflaging the costs of shareholder lawsuits.
This Article has focused on D&O insurance because the
economic benefits of segmented settlements are likely to be greatest
in the context of shareholder litigation. But towers are not unique to
D&O coverage. Cases involving settlement conflicts between primary
and excess insurers have arisen in the contexts of insurance for legal
195
196
197
malpractice liability, property damage liability, products liability,
198
and marine liability. Segmenting settlements should provide similar
benefits in lawsuits covered by these types of liability insurance as
well, assuming that the defendants are public corporations or their
managers. Such cases would benefit from the segmented approach
because they involve agents (corporate managers) who often wish to
run their own defenses and who have a conflict of interests with their
principals (public shareholders) that encourages overspending on
liability coverage. The arguments advanced in this Article suggest
that courts also should encourage segmented settlements on publicpolicy grounds in this broader context, despite likely resistance from
corporate managers. At a minimum, courts should recognize that the
conflict of interests in negotiations to settle shareholder lawsuits is
not inevitable. Rather, the conflict most likely persists because it
favors the interests of attorneys and corporate managers, even while a
more efficient approach is available.

195. E.g., Fireman’s Fund, 367 A.2d at 866.
196. E.g., Me. Bonding & Cas. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Or. 1985).
197. See e.g., Syverud, supra note 43, at 1194–95 (describing coverage purchased by the
manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device).
198. E.g., Keystone Shipping Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 840 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1988)
(involving a shipping company that had purchased six layers of marine-liability coverage).
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Appendix
This Appendix presents in general terms the various settlementnegotiation scenarios that the Article has illustrated through
numerical examples. A few simplifying assumptions are retained: that
the time value of money is zero, the parties are risk-neutral, the trial
outcomes are dichotomous, and the defendant has sufficient wealth to
pay any damages award. Another assumption, later relaxed, is that
the parties have common estimates of the potential damages.
Terms are defined as follows:
D

potential damages

p

probability (between 0 and 1, exclusive) of a verdict for
the plaintiff

kP

plaintiff’s trial costs

kD

defense’s trial costs

L

policy limit

S

total pre-trial settlement amount

SI

settlement amount paid by the liability insurer

SD

settlement amount paid by the insured defendant

T

transfer captured by the duty to contribute

1. No insurance
Considered first is a lawsuit against a defendant without
insurance. The plaintiff will be willing to settle pre-trial for no less
than pD - kP, and the defendant will be willing to settle for no more
than pD + kD, making the following true:
199

(3)

199

pD - kP < S < pD + kD

Numbering is continuous with that begun with the two equations in Part II.A.
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The width of the range of possible settlements is kP + kD, which is the
surplus from settling.
2. Collective settlements without settlement duties
Next is considered a scenario in which the defendant has liability
insurance, settlements are collective, and there are no settlement
duties. As is typical with D&O insurance, the assumption throughout
is that the insurer provides both liability coverage and defense
coverage and that both are subject to the same policy limit. In this
and subsequent scenarios involving collective settlements, two further
assumptions are necessary in order that the insurer has a conflict of
interests with the defendant. First, it is assumed that L < D + kD,
meaning that the policy limit is less than the potential damages plus
the defense’s trial costs, and hence that the defendant faces potential
trial liability. Second, it is assumed that kD < L, meaning that the
defense’s trial costs are less than the policy limit. Without this second
assumption, the insurer would be liable for its full policy amount
regardless of what happened at trial, and therefore it would not be
undermotivated to settle.
On these assumptions, the insurer’s expected trial liability is
pL + (1 - p)kD, meaning that the insurer expects to pay its policy limit
when the plaintiff prevails at trial, and to pay the defense costs when
the defendant prevails. In negotiations between the plaintiff and the
insurer, the settlement amount is as follows:
(4)

If p(L - D) +(1 - p)kD + kP < 0, then SI = Ø

(5)

If p(L - D) + (1 - p)kD + kP > 0,
then pD - kP < SI < pL + (1 - p)kD

A possibility exists that a settlement will not be reached between the
plaintiff and insurer, which will occur if the potential damages (D) are
too large relative to the policy limit (L). Whereas the width of the
settlement range was previously kD + kP, it is now p(L - D) + (1 - p)kD
+ kP. This second amount could be negative, precluding settlement.
In this and all subsequent scenarios involving negotiations with
the defendant, the defendant could be replaced with an excess
insurer, and the same results would apply assuming that the damages
plus the defense’s trial expenses do not exceed the excess limit.
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3. Segmented settlements
If instead the segmented settlements approach were used, two
different negotiations would occur, one between the insurer and the
plaintiff, and the other between the defendant and the plaintiff. As
suggested in Part III.A, the assumption will be that when one
defense-side party settles, the other is responsible for the full defense
costs of trial. Therefore, the maximum amount that each defense-side
party will be willing to pay to settle equals the defense’s trial costs
plus the expected value of the party’s segment of the damages range.
Because the plaintiff needs to settle with both defense-side parties to
avoid trial, he will be willing to accept from each defense-side party
that party’s potential damages liability minus the plaintiff’s full trial
costs. The following inequalities are thus true:
(6)

pL - kP < SI < pL + kD

(7)

p(D - L) – kP < SD < p(D - L) + pkD

Both inequalities have a solution for all possible values of the
variables; thus, unlike in the collective settlements scenario without
settlement duties, there is no possibility of trial. The total settlement
amount, equal to SI + SD, is given as follows:
(8)

pD - 2kP < S < pD + 2kD

The width of the possible settlements range is 2kP + 2kD, which is
wider than that given in inequality (3) by the amounts of the trial
costs on both sides. The widening is symmetrical around the expected
damages, indicating no systematic bias toward plaintiff
overcompensation or undercompensation relative to the scenario
without insurance.
4. Collective settlements with the duty to settle
The next scenario returns returns to the collective settlements
approach, except that settlement duties now apply, and an additional
assumption is made that pD < L. Based on this assumption, the case is
considered where the plaintiff makes a settlement offer within the
policy limit, triggering the duty to settle. Assuming a court would
consider this offer reasonable, the range of potential settlements is
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the same as that given by inequality (3), above. Thus, when the
expected damages are less than the policy limit, under the collective
settlements approach the duty to settle achieves a negotiated
settlement without biasing the negotiations toward plaintiff
overcompensation or undercompensation relative to the case without
insurance.
5. Collective settlements with the duty to contribute
The alternative scenario with collective settlements and
settlement duties arises when pD > L, meaning that the expected
damages are greater than the policy limit. Based on this assumption,
the case is considered in which the plaintiff makes an above-limit
settlement offer, implicating the duty to contribute. As long as a court
deems the settlement amount reasonable, the defendant can settle for
an amount above L and then use the duty to recover L from the
insurer. The range of possible settlements in negotiations between the
defendant and the plaintiff becomes:
(9)

pD - kP < SD < L + p(D - L) + pkD

This inequality has a solution for all possible values of the variables,
assuring settlement.
As noted, the insurer contributes L to this settlement, whereas
the maximum it would pay without the duty to contribute—equal to
its expected trial liability—is pL + (1 - p)kD, as shown in inequality
(6). The difference between the two is the transfer captured by the
duty to contribute, which as discussed in Part II.A is the amount of
potential plaintiff overcompensation:
(10)

T = (1 - p)L – (1 - p)kD

Notably, the amount of the transfer also equals the difference
between the maximum amount the defendant is willing to pay as
expressed in inequality (9), where she has insurance, and the
maximum amount she is willing to pay in inequality (3), where she
lacks insurance. In other words, the duty to contribute has widened
the potential settlement range by T. And it has done so
asymmetrically, increasing the defendant’s willingness to pay by the
amount of the transfer without lowering the minimum amount the
plaintiff is willing to accept.
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The transfer as represented in equation (10) is smaller than that
given by equation (1) in Part II.A, which ignores trial costs. The
difference is (1 - p)kD, which reflects the insurer’s expected share of
the trial costs, and which is avoided in case of settlement. The transfer
will always be positive given the assumption noted earlier that kD < L.
The adjustment for trial costs does not change the two
observations
about
the
plaintiff-overcompensation
hazard
emphasized in Part II.A: that the size of the transfer (and hence the
potential amount of plaintiff overcompensation) rises as the
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff falls; and, in an insurance
tower, that the size of the transfer increases with the number of
policies. This second observation remains true because, as described
in Part II.A, an increase in the number of policies raises L, which in
the multi-insurer setting represents the policy limit nearest D without
exceeding it. In addition, because the defense trial costs (kD) are
200
unlikely to increase linearly with the potential damages (D),
whereas in a tower the policy limit closest to the potential damages
from below (L) will increase linearly (albeit discontinuously) with the
potential damages, the size of the transfer as expressed in equation
(10) increases with the potential damages.
6. Duty to contribute with plaintiff or insurer overconfidence
This Article argued in Part IV.B.1 that the duty to contribute can
help achieve a covered settlement when the plaintiff places a higher
value on his case than the defense-side parties do. This argument can
be shown here by defining two additional variables: p1 and p2, the
plaintiff’s and the defense-side parties’ respective estimates of the
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff if trial occurs. The assumption
will be that p1 > p2, creating the type of disagreement that can cause
negotiations to break down.
We will consider first the case in which the defendant has just
one insurer. For this case, the assumption will be that D + kD < L,
meaning the full potential costs of trial to the defense-side parties
would be covered by the insurer. In negotiations between the insurer
and the plaintiff, the settlement amount is as follows:

200

See supra Part I.B.
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(11)

If (p2 - p1)D + kD + kP < 0, then SI = Ø

(12)

If (p2 - p1)D + kD + kP > 0, then p1D - kP < SI < p2D + kD

[Vol. 62:1

The difference between the plaintiff’s and the defense-side parties’
estimates of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff has created
the risk that the plaintiff and the insurer will fail to reach a
settlement, leaving the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s settlement
demand if she wishes to avoid trial.
To reduce the risk that she will be faced with a choice between
paying for a settlement herself and going to trial, the defendant can
divide coverage between two insurers, creating the possibility that
one will use the duty to contribute to cram down a settlement on the
other. To express this in general terms, we will assume that defendant
acquires a primary policy with limit LI and an excess policy with an
attachment point of LI and a limit of LII. Consistent with previous
scenarios, the assumption is that kD < LI. The duty to contribute is
implicated if the plaintiff makes a settlement demand that equals at
least his estimate of the expected damages, assuming that LI < p1D
and that any settlement amount reached by the parties would be
considered reasonable by a court. A further simplifying assumption
will be that D + kD < LII. This last assumption excludes the defendant
from settlement negotiations, limiting the negotiations to the plaintiff
and the insurers. Now the range of possible settlements between the
plaintiff and the excess insurer, expressed as SII, is as follows:
(13)

If (1 - p2)LI + (p2 – p1)D + p2kD + kP < 0, then SII = Ø

(14)

If (1 - p2)LI + (p2 - p1)D + p2kD + kP > 0,
then p1D - kP < SII < LI + p2(D - LI) + p2kD

Comparing the condition on inequality (14) to that on inequality
(12) shows the change in the range of potential values for which a
settlement can be reached. This comparison shows that the settlement
range has been widened by (1 - p2)LI – (1 - p2)kD. Comparing this
difference to equation (10) indicates that this is the wealth transfer
from the primary insurer produced by the duty to contribute as
calculated by the defense-side parties—that is, based on their
estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff. Since their
estimate of this value is lower, the transfer is larger than it would be if
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based on the plaintiff’s estimate. Thus, the duty to contribute has
increased the range of settlement demands that will produce an
insurance-covered settlement by the amount of the wealth transfer
away from the primary insurer.
7. Duty to contribute with a possible coverage exclusion
Part IV.B.2 explained that the duty to contribute can also
increase the likelihood of a covered settlement when there is a
possibility that trial will produce a finding of deliberate defendant
misconduct that triggers an insurance coverage exclusion. This
possibility can be represented by defining a new term, e, as the
probability that, if the trial verdict is for the plaintiff, the verdict
includes a finding that excludes coverage. By assumption the value of
e is known to all parties. To isolate the effect of this new factor, we
also will resort to the previous assumption that all parties have a
common estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff, again
represented by p.
As in the previous scenario, the first case considered is where the
defendant has just one insurance policy and D + kD < L. In
negotiations between the insurer and plaintiff, the settlement amount
is as follows:
(15)

If (1 – ep)kD + kP – epD < 0, then SI = Ø

(16)

If (1 – ep)kD + kP – epD > 0,
then pD - kP < SI < (1 – e)pD + (1 – ep)kD

As is intuitive, the risk of a failed negotiation, given by equation (15),
rises with e, the probability of a coverage exclusion.
As in the last scenario, the alternative case occurs when the
defendant has acquired both a primary policy with limit LI and an
excess policy with an attachment point of LI and a limit of LII. Once
again the assumptions are that kD < LI and D + kD < LII. The duty to
contribute is implicated if the plaintiff makes a settlement offer
equaling at least the expected damages and LI < pD. Assuming again
that a court would consider reasonable any settlement reached by the
parties, the range of possible settlements between the plaintiff and
the excess insurer, expressed again as SII, is as follows:
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(17)

If (1 – p)LI - ep(D - LI) + (1 – e)pkD + kP < 0, then SII = Ø

(18)

If (1 – p)LI - ep(D - LI) + (1 – e)pkD + kP > 0,
then pD - kP < SII < LI + (1 – e)p(D - LI) +(1 – e)pkD

Comparing the condition on inequality (18) to that on inequality (16)
gives the change in the range of potential values for which a
settlement can be reached. That comparison shows that the range has
widened by (1 - p)LI + epLI - (1 - p)kD. This is the wealth transfer from
the primary insurer produced by the duty to contribute in this case.
The transfer is larger than that calculated in equation (10) by epLI,
reflecting the capture by the cramdown settlement of the reduction in
the primary insurer’s expected trial liability caused by the possibility
of a coverage exclusion. Thus, the duty to contribute has increased
the range of settlement demands that will produce an insurancecovered settlement by the amount of the wealth transfer that the duty
captures.

